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ABSTRACT
User reviews are ubiquitous. They power online review aggregators that influence our daily-
based decisions, from what products to purchase (e.g., Amazon), movies to view (e.g., Netflix,
HBO, Hulu), restaurants to patronize (e.g., Yelp), and hotels to book (e.g., TripAdvisor, Airbnb).
In addition, policy makers rely on online commenting platforms like Regulations.gov and FCC.gov
as a means for citizens to voice their opinions about public policy issues. However, showcasing
the opinions of fellow users has a dark side as these reviews and comments are vulnerable to
manipulation. And as advances in AI continue, fake reviews generated by AI agents rather than
users pose even more scalable and dangerous manipulation attacks. These attacks on online dis-
course can sway ratings of products, manipulate opinions and perceived support of key issues,
and degrade our trust in online platforms. Previous efforts have mainly focused on highly visible
anomaly behaviors captured by statistical modeling or clustering algorithms. While detection of
such anomalous behaviors helps to improve the reliability of online interactions, it misses subtle
and difficult-to-detect behaviors.
This research investigates two major research thrusts centered around manipulation strategies.
In the first thrust, we study crowd-based manipulation strategies wherein crowds of paid workers
organize to spread fake reviews. In the second thrust, we explore AI-based manipulation strategies,
where crowd workers are replaced by scalable, and potentially undetectable generative models of
fake reviews. In particular, one of the key aspects of this work is to address the research gap in pre-
vious efforts for anomaly detection where ground truth data is missing (and hence, evaluation can
be challenging). In addition, this work studies the capabilities and impact of model-based attacks
as the next generation of online threats. We propose inter-related methods for collecting evidence
of these attacks, and create new countermeasures for defending against them. The performance
of proposed methods are compared against other state-of-the-art approaches in the literature. We
find that although crowd campaigns do not show obvious anomaly behavior, they can be detected
given a careful formulation of their behaviors. And, although model-generated fake reviews may
ii
appear on the surface to be legitimate, we find that they do not completely mimic the underlying
distribution of human-written reviews, so we can leverage this signal to detect them.
iii
Dedicated to my family – I love you.
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1. INTRODUCTION
User generated content is ubiquitous. In particular, user review aggregators are a cornerstone
of how we make decisions – from deciding what products to purchase (e.g., Amazon), movies
to view (e.g., Netflix, HBO, Hulu), restaurants to patronize (e.g., Yelp), and hotels to book (e.g.,
TripAdvisor, Airbnb). Figure 1.1 shows an example of a review on Amazon along with other
contextual information such as the reviewer, review title, time stamp and ratings. One study shows
that 93% of consumers read reviews to determine the quality of a business [1]. This study also
highlights the importance of user reviews through some key statistics: positive reviews influence
73% of users to trust a business, while 50% of users would question the quality of a business after
reading negative reviews. In addition, policy makers rely on online commenting platforms like
Regulations.gov and FCC.gov as a means for citizens to voice their opinions about public policy
issues. Figure 1.2 shows an example of a comment posted to the FCC about net neutrality policy.
However, showcasing the opinions of fellow users has a dark side as these reviews and com-
ments are vulnerable to manipulation. For example, about one out of five reviews on Yelp are
suspected of being fake according to Yelp’s proprietary filtering algorithm [2]. Furthermore, a
recent study of comments posted to the FCC about repealing net neutrality found that over one
million pro-repeal comments were likely faked; in contrast, a majority of the legitimate comments
were in favor of keeping net neutrality [3]. And as advances in AI continue, fake reviews generated
by AI agents rather than users pose even more scalable and dangerous manipulation attacks [4].
These attacks on online discourse can sway ratings of products, manipulate opinions and perceived
support of key issues, and degrade our trust in online platforms [5].
With these challenges in mind, this dissertation research investigates manipulation powered by
humans and AI in large-scale review platforms and proposes frameworks to combat them. There-
fore, the dissertation is aligned along two major research thrusts centered around manipulation
strategies. In the first thrust, we investigate crowd-based manipulation campaigns. In these cam-
paigns, crowds of paid workers organize to spread fake reviews. In the second thrust, we investigate
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Figure 1.1: Example book review on Amazon
Figure 1.2: Example comment on FCC about net neutrality issue
AI-based manipulation campaigns, where crowd workers are replaced by scalable, and potentially
undetectable generative models of fake reviews. In particular, one of the key aspects of this disser-
tation is to address the research gap in previous efforts for anomaly detection where ground truth
data is missing (and hence, evaluation can be challenging). In addition, this dissertation investi-
gates the capabilities and impact of model-based attacks as the next generation of online threats.
For both crowd-based and AI-based manipulation, we study the capabilities and impact of these
approaches, propose inter-related methods for collecting evidence of these attacks, modeling attack
behaviors, and create new countermeasures for defending against them.
2
1.1 Research Questions and Contributions
Concretely, this dissertation research aims to address three overarching research questions:
• RQ1 What are the characteristics of crowd-based manipulation attacks and how can we
detect them? (Chapter 3)
• RQ2 What are the characteristics of AI-based manipulation attacks and how can we detect
them? (Chapter 4)
• RQ3 How can we leverage AI for more sophisticated attacks? (Chapter 5)
In response to these questions, this dissertation defines six research objectives and makes the
following specific contributions to achieve these objectives:
• RO1: Can we sample evidence of review manipulation and understand crowd manipulation
behavior for development and evaluation of detection methods? This objective complements
proposed methods in previous works which are typically evaluated based on i) manually
labeled dataset, ii) simulation of fake review behavior, or iii) examination of highly visible
fraudulent users.
Contributions: In this dissertation, we implement a cross-domain paradigm to obtain a
pool of crowd manipulation traces. In particular this framework: (i) monitors crowdsourcing
websites that task crowd workers to write fake reviews on Amazon products, (ii) links these
tasks to Amazon platform to identify the products that are targets of fake reviews, and (iii)
crawls the reviews and reviewers associated to such products.
• RO2: Can we detect manipulators who seek to camouflage their behaviors? It is notable
that crowd campaigns are small in size meaning they often target particular items with care-
fully targeted fake reviews, meaning they do not leave obvious traces of anomaly behaviors.
Detecting manipulators would help system administrators to remove them and improve the
quality of the reviews.
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Contributions: In this dissertation, we propose a comprehensive framework called TwoFace
to uncover crowd review manipulators. Two of the key components of TwoFace are: (i) prop-
agating the “suspiciousness” of seed manipulators to identify nearby users through a random
walk over a “suspiciousness” graph, and (ii) uncovering distant users who serve structurally
similar roles by mapping users into a low-dimensional embedding space that captures com-
munity structure. TwoFace uncovers many manipulators even when the system is seeded
with only a few fraudulent samples with 93% recall and 77% precision, outperforming the
state-of-the-art baseline.
• RO3: Can we identify the targets of crowd review manipulation, rather than just individual
review manipulators? Concretely, this research objective is to recognize manipulation pat-
terns at the item level. Knowing which products (or services, etc.) are targets of an attack
and understanding their review behavior, we can deploy more resources to defend the targets
from ongoing threats (e.g., require additional user verification or enlist more human moder-
ators). Therefore, we can develop more robust defensive countermeasures for future threats
(e.g., by learning patterns of what is being targeted). In addition, understanding fake review
behaviors helps us to develop robust recommendation techniques that diminish the impact of
fake reviews on recommendation results.
Contributions: We first propose a data expansion methodology to obtain a rich set of tar-
get products by leveraging the notion of suspicious reviewers. In the next step, we pro-
pose a comprehensive framework called TOmCAT abbreviated from Target-Oriented Crowd
ATtack. TOmCAT is composed of three key components: (i) identifying crowd attack foot-
prints and formulating them into a suite of features based on timing and ratings; (ii) embed-
ding attack footprints in a 3-layer neural network to uncover target products; and (iii) finally,
augmenting TOmCAT to counter strategic attacks that attempt to create hard-to-detect behav-
ioral patterns by undermining timing-based footprints. TOmCAT uncovers target products
with 84% accuracy and outperforms state of the art techniques.
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• RO4: What are the characteristics of AI-powered review manipulation where crowd workers
are replaced by generative models of fake reviews? And can we detect this type of manip-
ulation? Especially, this class of attacks creates new challenges for defense mechanisms,
including: (i) scalability, since AI approaches do not rely on paying workers, meaning large-
scale attacks can be launched; (ii) increased deception, since AI approaches can potentially
obfuscate signals left by crowd campaigns (e.g., by varying the rate of posting fake reviews)
that are helpful for detection. However, generating high quality reviews that are readable by
humans is a challenge on its own.
Contributions: In this dissertation, we develop a comprehensive framework called DIOR
comprising three main components. It first demonstrates the success of AI agents in gener-
ating high-quality synthetic reviews by leveraging neural language models. The main con-
tribution here is to develop a universal model capable of generating user reviews across
different domains benefiting from transfer learning techniques. In the next step, it shows
that synthetic reviews are robust against linguistic-based spam detectors. More importantly,
we conduct a user study that demonstrates these reviews are considered to be realistic by
human judges. Finally, it proposes a discriminator leveraging distributed representation of
the reviews to distinguish between synthetic and user written reviews. The major finding
is that synthetic reviews successfully pass traditional computational detectors and human
tests confirming the power of AI in review manipulation. However, the proposed defense
mechanism is able to distinguish synthetic and real reviews with 90% accuracy.
• RO5: What are the differences between crowd and AI-based manipulation in terms of quality
of reviews written by humans and reviews generated by models? This research objective seek
to answer the important question of whether the proposed DIOR generator is capable enough
to take the place of crowd campaigns.
Contributions: We conduct a user study to evaluate how end users perceive the fake reviews
generated by the proposed DIOR compared with those written by crowd manipulators. The
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main finding is that users find model-generated reviews as reliable as fake reviews written
by crowd campaigns.
• RO6: Finally, what is the potential of more sophisticated AI-based manipulation to go be-
yond the proposed DIOR framework? Addressing the fourth research objective, we face a
new challenge that motivates us to develop new generative models in order to control the
topic and sentiment of generated reviews. Although DIOR shows success in generating
grammatically correct, meaningful and human-readable reviews, it does not reflect the de-
sired aspect and sentiment of the reviews. It should be noted that content in review platforms
are personalized for each item or service rather than the same content being duplicated across
different items or services. Therefore, we propose to model a topic-aware generator while
the main challenge is the lack of a review dataset with labels at topic and sentiment level.
Contributions: In this dissertation, we develop a framework called ADORE (Aspect Depen-
dent REview labeling) comprising two main components. It first proposes a weak labeling
methodology to build a large-scale dataset of reviews labeled at aspect and sentiment levels.
Then it proposes a joint neural model that encodes aspect and sentiment into the language
model. We extensively evaluate the quality of assigned labels and generated reviews.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive literature review and highlights the contributions of this
dissertation in connection with prior work.
• Chapter 3 gives a thorough description of crowd-based manipulation and the curated dataset.
It studies and evaluates the proposed frameworks to detect manipulators and targets of ma-
nipulation. In summary, research objectives 1 to 3 and their corresponding contributions are
discussed in this chapter.
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• Chapter 4 describes AI-based manipulation and gives the details of the proposed framework
from generation, evaluation and mitigation aspects. It compares the capability of AI-based
attacks against crowd manipulators. In summary, in this chapter we cover research objectives
4 and 5 and their corresponding contributions.
• Chapter 5 describes the components of the proposed framework for validating more sophis-
ticated attacks. This chapter covers research objective 6 and its corresponding contributions.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the outcomes and findings in this dissertation and provides several
open directions for future work.
1.3 Publications
Table 1.1 contains the list of main publications that are the result of this dissertation and have
appeared in peer-reviewed top-tier web and data mining conferences. It also contains our proposal
for future work.
Table 1.1: List of publications that are the result of this dissertation research
Publication Chapter
[6] P. Kaghazgaran, J. Caverlee, M. Alfifi “ Behavioral Analysis of Review Fraud:
Linking Malicious Crowdsourcing to Amazon and Beyond”, ICWSM’17. 3
[7] P. Kaghazgaran, A. Squicciarini, J. Caverlee "Combating Crowdsourced Review
Manipulators: A Neighborhood-Based Approach”, WSDM’18 3
[8] P. Kaghazgaran, M. Alfifi, J. Caverlee "TOmCAT: Target-Oriented Crowd
Review ATtacks & Countermeasures", ICWSM’19 3
[9] P. Kaghazgaran, M. Alfifi, J. Caverlee "Wide-Ranging Review Manipulation
Attacks: Model, Empirical Study, and Countermeasures”, CIKM’19. 4
[10] P. Kaghazgaran, J. Wang, R. Huang, J. Caverlee “ADORE: Aspect Dependent Online
Review Labeling for Review Generation”, SIGIR’20. 5
[11] P. Kaghazgaran, J. Caverlee “Towards an Automated Writing Assistant for
Online Reviews”, CHI AutomationXP20 Workshop. 5
J. Caverlee, P. Kaghazgaran "Explainable Online Manipulation Detection",
proposal submitted to Sony Inc. 6
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2. RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss related work from the aspects of traditional and model-based ma-
nipulation in line with the two major thrusts of this dissertation.
2.1 Traditional Manipulation
Propagation of false information has been studied on different platforms such as Twitter [12,
13, 14], Facebook [15, 16, 17] and Wikipedia [18]. This dissertation narrows the focus to deception
in e-commerce and review platforms [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
Indeed, many previous efforts have explored methods to uncover review manipulation, often by
applying techniques based on machine learning [19, 20, 21, 22], graph mining [23, 24, 25] algo-
rithms, or via probabilistic modeling of user behaviors [26, 27, 28]. However, the research gap
is that the actual intent to deceive is unknown and these methods typically are built and validated
over a dataset of “known" manipulated reviews. In this section, we provide a taxonomy of the
related work based on their evaluation methods and point out how this dissertation complements
previous approaches and addresses this gap by understanding the intention behind crowdsourcing
campaigns.
• Manual labeling of fake reviews: In the first approach, judges – often either researchers
themselves or a team of labelers at a review site – assess individual reviews to determine
if they are fake or not [29, 30]. These methods sometimes rely on unsupervised algorithms
(e.g., the output of a proprietary company algorithm) or on manual and possibly error-prone
labeling of fake reviews without access to a ground truth of the actual intent of the review
writers themselves.
• Ex post analysis of outliers: A second approach is to validate detection algorithms through
ex post analysis of suspicious reviews. Typically, an algorithm is run over a collection of
reviews and the top-ranked results are examined [23, 24, 31, 32]. This approach tends to
focus on highly-visible fake behaviors (e.g., a reviewer who posts dozens of reviews in a
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period of minutes), but may miss more subtle behaviors.
• Simulation of bad behavior: The third approach is to simulate the behaviors of malicious
workers [33] in which volunteers are asked to imagine themselves as fake review writers
and then post fake reviews. This method lacks insight into the strategies and motivations
of actual fake review writers. The simulation also can be done by injecting dense blocks
into the matrix (or tensor) representing review data [34, 35]. However, these approaches
may have difficulty in detecting subtle attacks where there are not such clearly defined dense
block characteristics.
In contrast to these efforts where the critical knowledge of intent to deceive is missing, this
dissertation research seeks to provide strong evidence of intent to deceive by building a ground-
truth of actual review manipulators and targets of manipulation.
To detect review manipulation, typical approaches tend to adopt one of the following proper-
ties:
• Text-based characteristics: The content of the reviews may offer indicators of “spamness”
or deception. Many works here develop NLP models to distinguish fake reviews from legit-
imate reviews [21, 33, 36, 29]. For example, linguistic features include, but are not limited
to, similarity, stylistic, lexical, psycho-linguistic and sentiment characteristics [33, 19, 37,
20, 38, 39, 40].
• Behavioral characteristics: The reviewers or the reviews may leave clues as to which are
fraudulent such as skewed rating distributions [41, 42] and dense inter-arrival times between
successive reviews [41, 42, 27]. However, the methods to capture these clues focus on in-
direct approaches, where the ground truth is necessarily an approximation. In other words,
they are only able to identify users with many reviews in a short burst of time or with skewed
rating/inter-arrival time distributions as suspicious [43, 35, 28, 44] while many seemingly
“normal” users may be overlooked in practice if their deceptive activities are blended in with
legitimate ones. In contrast, this dissertation aims to identify users who have been tasked by
a crowdsourcing site. In this way, we can identify with high confidence users who are indeed
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deceptive even if the majority of their reviews are legitimate.
• Network characteristics: Graph-based approaches model users as nodes and their relation-
ships as edges. Approaches include spectral methods like eigen-decomposition or singular
value decomposition to cluster similar nodes in the graph [45, 46, 47]. Iterative models to
label nodes as trustworthy or non-trustworthy are proposed in [23, 48]. Markov Random
Fields (MRF) and belief propagation approaches have been used to identify dense and most
likely suspicious sub-graphs [49, 24]. In another view, malicious users are detected through
graph-based measures like neighborhood diversity [32]. A separate direction detects dense
blocks in a ratings matrix [43, 34, 35], to find clusters of coordinating raters. Extraordinary
dense blocks correspond to groups of users with lockstep behaviors, e.g., [43]. Moreover,
this method has been lately extended from matrix to tensor representation to incorporate
more dimensions (e.g., temporal aspects) [34, 35]. Contrary to dense block detection algo-
rithms that focus on lockstep behavior – meaning a high number of fake ratings are required
– a target of crowdsourcing manipulation (e.g., a product on Amazon) may be subject to
dozens of fake reviews. Specifically, we find that the number of required fake reviews re-
quested by paymasters varies: the average is 13, but some paymasters ask for only 1, while
the maximum requester asked for 75 reviews and 84% of the tasks require fewer than 20 fake
reviews. This indicates the challenge in identifying fraudulent behavior.
2.2 Model-based Manipulation
This section discusses related work with respect to model-based review manipulation from two
angles of generation and detection and highlights this dissertation’s contributions in connection
with prior work:
Generation. Here, we first give an overview of the literature for automated text generation and
then turn to review generation more specifically.
Natural language generation techniques place structured data into well-designed templates
[50, 51]. These systems require rules and consistent format. Probabilistic approaches like N-
gram models generate text by looking back only a few steps in the sequence [52]. While N-gram
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models exhibit limitation against long text sequences, RNN-based models perform based on com-
plex “memory" gating which maintain longer term dependency [53, 54, 55]. The application of
RNN-based text generators on different domains like chatbot [56], conversational systems [57],
email auto-responses [58], movie dialogues [59] and image captioning [60] has shown successful
results. In another direction, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been explored to fill
in the blanks in sentences [61]. They were originally designed to produce differentiable values
that have direct application in computer vision, so generating discrete text is a challenge for them.
On the other hand, researchers have shown that properly regularized RNN models can achieve
state-of-the-art performance in generating text [62].
With respect to research on automated review generation, character-level RNNs to capture
the sentiment and meaning in product reviews have been proposed in [63]. Byte-level RNN to
generate product reviews for sentiment classification is proposed in [64]. An N-gram based review
generator is examined in an adversarial setting with the purpose of generating fake reviews [65]
without considering any countermeasures. In another effort, [4, 66] propose a character-level RNN
to generate fake reviews for the specific domain of Yelp. [66] uses sequence-to-sequence neural
models to incorporate contextual information such as location into the model.
In contrast to this dissertation, these previous works do not consider a universal model capable
of generating domain independent reviews. The character-level model comes with its own issues
like misspelling, requiring a large dataset, and days to converge which limits its applicability. In
addition, such models cannot benefit from transfer learning and need to be built from scratch for
the new domain as the characters remain the same across different domains.
Similar to our work, a few studies also explore the impact of transfer learning on NLP tasks.
This includes work on sentiment classification [67], multilingual language modeling [68], machine
translation [69] and question and answering [70]. To the best of our knowledge this is the first to
explore the power of transfer learning in generating domain-independent online reviews.
Detection. Here, we first give an overview of the literature on detecting generated content in
general and then discuss detecting automated review manipulation more specifically.
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Statistical approaches like measuring TF-IDF or examining Zipf’s law on the target text are pro-
posed to detect machine-generated text with the focus on textual features [71, 72]. [66] uses N-
gram features to classify reviews as real or synthetic. Recent advances in GANs that produce
synthetic images suggest mimicking the underlying distribution of the image where the discrim-
inator is responsible to distinguish between the distribution of true and generated samples [73].
In this dissertation, inspired by the idea of the discriminator in GANs, we propose to distinguish
between real and synthetic reviews based on the distributed representation of their constituent to-
kens. It should be noted that the method proposed in [4] to defend against model-generated reviews
examines the character distribution of synthetic and real reviews as the language model is trained
at character level granularity. Therefore, the direct application of this approach on word-level
generators is ruled out.
As mentioned earlier, the last research objective of this dissertation is to validate more so-
phisticated automated attacks on review platforms where it can control the topic and sentiment of
the generated review. For this purpose, we provide a literature review over the techniques related
to this problem and highlight the contributions offered by this dissertation. Hence, this related
work is discussed from three dimensions: aspect extraction, sequence to sequence modeling, and
attribute-based review generation.
Aspect Extraction: There is a large body of research to extract the aspects of products wherein
users have expressed opinions in order to analyse the crowd sentiment towards these aspects [74,
75, 76, 77, 78]. These methods are based on relatively explicit representations of the text and
attempt to model each topic as distribution of its words. Aspect extraction has been performed
using methods like frequent pattern mining [74], topic modeling [75], word alignment [76], label
propagation [77] and recently deep neural networks [78]. In contrast this dissertation aims to build
a dataset of reviews at topic and sentiment levels for generating aspect-aware reviews and to do
that it proposed to find the topic boundaries in a review so that it can segment a review into its
aspect-specific parts
Sequence-to-Sequence Models. Sequence models are trained to convert an input sequence into a
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target sequence. Applications like question answering [79], neural translation [80], chatbot [56],
conversational systems [57], email auto-responses [58] and image captioning [60] have been de-
veloped under the umbrella of sequence-to-sequence architectures. However, due to lack of ground
truth of aspect-aware reviews and non-sequential nature of the attributes, the direct application of
seq2seq models in our problem domain is challenging.
Attribute-based Review Generation. In another direction, research has focused on generating
product reviews from attributes [81, 82]. These models learn to generate customized reviews for
each user based on history of their review writing. The input attributes are rating, product ID and
user ID. This dissertation focuses on aspect as an attribute. There is a car review dataset [83] at the
aspect level, where each review already contains eight sentences for eight aspects and the proposed
model generates reviews that cover all the aspects. However, in general domains like restaurants
and e-commerce platforms, users are not forced to describe all aspects of the target. Also, they may
use several sentences to describe a single aspect which we refer to as segments. This dissertation
aims to extract aspect-specific segments to build the ground truth.
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3. CROWD-BASED MANIPULATION
In this chapter, we describe crowd-based manipulation from sampling manipulation traces to
detecting manipulators and targets of manipulation attacks. In particular, we develop a cross-
domain data collection approach to obtain samples of crowd manipulation and propose two com-
prehensive frameworks known as TwoFace and TOmCAT to detect manipulators and targets of
manipulation respectively.
3.1 Sampling Review Manipulation Traces
The purpose of this step is to build the review manipulation ground truth at scale. The main
insight is that evidence of “intent to deceive” is extremely difficult to determine from the review
domain alone, and yet, critical to successfully uncovering manipulation. To address this chal-
lenge, we propose a cross-domain approach and develop two different crawlers to obtain evidence
of manipulation and consequently collect associated reviews and reviewers’ activities. Figure 3.1
demonstrates the workflow of crowd review manipulation wherein a worker visits the crowdsourc-
ing sites, picks a task that asks users to write inauthentic reviews on review platforms, writes review
and gets paid in return. The data collection is based on this workflow.
As an example, consider the task posted to RapidWorkers in Figure 3.2. This type of task is
common on RapidWorkers and related sites like ShortTask and Microworkers. As an example of
the type of review that is created by crowd worker, Figure 3.3 shows a sample of a crowdsourced
review for a “cortisol supplement” product sold by Amazon. On examination, this review displays
few (if any) clear signals of it being fraudulently written.
Hence, this dissertation focuses on tasks posted to RapidWorkers that target Amazon and si-
multaneously ask for fake reviews. Note that there are many such sites1 and many additional targets
(e.g., Yelp, App Store, Play Store).
Concretely, the first crawler monitors low moderation crowdsourcing sites, where pay-masters
1We also checked several other crowdsourcing websites such as ShortTask, Microworkers and Amazon Mechanical





✓Read the product description before 
writing down a review.
✓Go to https://goo.gl/7QfW0h
✓Leave a relevant 5-star review with at 
least 40 words.
✓Provide the proof that you left the 
review your self.
Target Review Platforms
Figure 3.1: Crowd Review Manipulation Workflow. A worker visits the crowdsourcing sites, picks
a task, writes a fake review and gets paid. Our data collection method is based on this workflow.
What is expected from workers?
Read the product description before writing down a review.
Go to https://goo.gl/7QfW0h.
Leave a relevant 5-star review with at least 40 words.
Provide proof that you left the review yourself.
Figure 3.2: An example crowdsourcing task.
? ? ? ? ? Best cortisol blocker to reduce high levels
of stress, July 24, 2017
My stress levels have increased lately due to heavy work
loads in my office and that directly impacting my life. we
have gained weight and easily gets tired. we have tried many
products to reduce my cortisol levels which is causing
stress, but those products don’t fetch any results and based
on my uncle recommendation we have tried this product and
it has relieved my stress and assisted in returning my
cortisol levels to a more natural state. we feel more energized
and active than before and the product also helped in
losing body fat. Must try the product.
Figure 3.3: An example review written by a crowd worker.
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task crowd workers to write a few fake and highly positive reviews on a specific product on Ama-
zon. The workers are paid a little (mostly less than $1) in return. Hence, it obtains a pool of crowd
tasks which we know for certain have targeted review sites with fake reviews. By linking these
tasks to the target review platform, the second crawler collects reviews associated with targets of
manipulation and the activity history of their reviewers. In total, we were able to identify 900
tasks targeting 533 unique products. We call these initial products the primary target products.
There are ∼33k associated reviews. Next, we explored the activity history of ∼14k reviewers
and crawled their reviews, resulting in ∼580k reviews. Ultimately, our dataset contains the fol-
lowing information: product ID, review ID, reviewer ID, review title, review content, rating, and
time-stamp.
To investigate the behavior of fraudulent vs non-fraudulent reviewers, we sampled reviewers
with at least 10 reviews. For non-fraudulent reviewers, we sampled reviewers from the Amazon
dataset introduced in [84], who co-reviewed products beyond those crowdsourcing products tar-
geted by a crowdsourcing attack giving us ∼38k reviewers in total.
We further propose an expansion methodology to gain a richer set of target products using the
notion of suspicious reviewers. Since not all reviewers on a target product are suspicious, we adapt
a similar methodology to that introduced in [19] in which users with a certain fraction of duplicate
or semi-duplicate reviews are labeled as spammers. To measure the similarity, we gauge the exact
matching between two reviews. Therefore, we calculate the Jaccard function between each pair
of reviews written by a single reviewer and take the maximum value as its Self-Similarity Score.
Formally, the self-similarity score of reviewer v with review collection of Rv is defined as:





We found 9,659 users with perfect self-similarity score and label them as suspicious reviewers.
In the next step, we explore the products which received reviews from suspicious reviewers and pull
out those with many reviews from suspicious reviewers and label such products as targets. Through
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our expansion methodology, about 3,500 products are identified which we call secondary target
products. Crawling reviews associated with secondary target products, a corpus of 2.6M reviews
is collected. In the experiments, the threshold is set conservatively such that target products were
targeted by many suspicious reviewers (which helps mitigate any errors in our original labeling of
suspicious reviewers).
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3.2 TwoFace Framework to Detect Manipulators
This dissertation proposes the TwoFace system to uncover crowdsourced review manipulators
who target online review systems. Detecting manipulators would help system administrators to
suspend or remove them and improve the quality of the reviews. In addition, detecting manipu-
lators is a reliable proxy to identify the fake reviews written by them given this fact that crowd
reviews demonstrate proper grammar and other evidence of being generated by actual people (not
bots) and it would be challenging to rely on textual content to detect them.
The aim is to study the challenge of countering crowd review manipulation in order to detect
the actors that enable such attacks. Concretely, the main contributions are:
1. We study genuine and fake review writers through statistical analysis of their behaviors. We
observe that fraudulent users engage in a mix of legitimate and deceptive behaviors and do
not show strong signals of deception. (Section 3.2.1)
2. Motivated by these observations, we propose to exploit neighborhood-based characteristics
of the reviewers themselves. The intuition is that although individual behaviors may be easy
to mask, the collective campaign organization may be uncovered by exploiting the network
around reviewers and products. Based on this intuition, the proposed TwoFace approach
propagates the suspiciousness of the original seed users to identify “similar” users through a
random walk over a “suspiciousness” graph. In this way, we can identify users who may be
likely to participate in deceptive review campaigns. (Section 3.2.3)
3. Given users who are distant in the “suspiciousness” graph will rarely be considered as decep-
tive reviewers, we propose an embedding-based approach to distinguish deceptive review-
ers through their community embedding structure. Based on this intuition, the proposed
TwoFace approach uncovers these (hidden) distant users who serve structurally similar roles
by mapping users into a low-dimensional embedding space that captures community struc-
ture. (Section 3.2.4)
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4. We evaluate the proposed framework from different angles and show that TwoFace uncovers
many manipulators even when the system is seeded with only a few fraudulent samples with
93% recall and 77% precision, outperforming a state-of-the-art baseline. (Section 3.2.5)
3.2.1 Behavioral vs. Network Characteristics
Over the dataset described above, we first study genuine and fake review writers through sta-
tistical analysis of their behaviors. A suite of observations demonstrates that although malicious
and benign reviewers occasionally behave differently, review manipulators engage in a deceptive
mix of legitimate reviews (to build reputation and trust) and fake reviews (to cash in on this trust)
as shown in Figure 3.4. In the following, we examine their behavior in terms of rating, review
burstiness, review length and self-similarity.
Ratings. we begin with Figure 3.4a, which shows the ratings distribution for reviews written by
the two types of reviewers. Echoing previous studies, e.g., [41], we see that crowdsourcing workers
tend to write 4 or 5-star reviews. While crowdsourcing efforts could be targeted at suppressing
the ratings for a competitor, we see instead that most efforts focus on promotion. Compared to
legitimate reviewers, the rate of 5-star reviews is 20% higher for fraudulent reviewers.
Review Length. We see in Figure 3.4b the distribution of the review length in terms of number
of words between the two groups. We can see that reviews by fraudulent reviewers are relatively
short. Even though task requestors require a minimum number of words for payment, these graphs
show that all reviews written by fraudulent reviewers are not necessarily a response to crowdsourc-
ing tasks which often require a word count minimum.
Burstiness of Reviews. Intuitively, crowd workers may seek to complete several tasks in a short
time to maximize their payoff. Hence, for each reviewer we measure the standard deviation of the
timestamp for that person’s reviews – we consider the last 10 reviews for reviewers with more than
10 reviews. we plot the distribution for this “burstiness” as seen in Figure 3.4c. In this case, a small
standard deviation corresponds to many reviews being posted in a short time window, whereas
a higher standard deviation corresponds to reviews posted over a long time period (and hence,
lacking burstiness). Contrary to our hypothesis, burstiness of reviews is not a strong indicator to
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distinguish fraudulent and non-fraudulent users.
Self-similarity. Finally, we measure how much a reviewer’s language mimics previous reviews
they have written. Perhaps fraudulent reviewers write according to a simple “template”, and so
new reviews tend to repeat language used in previous ones. Here, we measure the lexical over-
lap between each two sequential reviews (ri, rj) written by the same reviewer using the Jaccard
similarity as JS = |ri∩rj ||ri∪rj | .
Figure 3.4d shows that non-fraudulent tend not to repeat themselves (low Jaccard score);
whereas fraudulent reviewers tend to rely on repeated keywords or phrases. Intuitively, review-
ers engaged in crowd-launched manipulation tend to mimic themselves over time since they are
not actually experienced with the actual product.
Based on this mix of somewhat encouraging features, we evaluate a variety of classifiers (see
Section 3.2.5). It turns out that these traditional features do a poor job of distinguishing these two-
faced reviewers. The hypothesis is that traditional signals may fail since these reviewers engage
in a mix of legitimate and deceptive reviews. Motivated by these observations, we turn to how
we can propagate the suspiciousness of our original seeds for uncovering unknown fraudulent
reviewers. We propose to exploit neighborhood-based characteristics of the reviewers themselves.
The intuition is that although individual behaviors may be easy to mask, the collective campaign
organization may be uncovered by exploiting the network around reviewers and products. In the
following, we first describe the research hypothesis followed by the techniques for propagating
suspiciousness and uncovering distant users.
3.2.2 TwoFace System Design
Figure 3.5 shows the overview of the TwoFace key components. It is designed to be deployed
in real-world scenarios with the following characteristics:
• First, we assume there is only some small, partial evidence of review manipulation. In contrast to
many previous efforts, we make no assumption that there is a large, curated collection of positive
and negative examples of review manipulation. This corresponds to real-world scenarios of
evolving and newly emerging types of review manipulation.
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Figure 3.4: Traditional features show some differences between fraudulent and non-fraudulent




















Figure 3.5: TwoFace overall framework.
• Second, we target scenarios in which review manipulation engages in difficult-to-detect behav-
iors. That is, the review manipulators may engage in a mix of legitimate and deceptive reviews,
so that many traditional content-based or dense-block methods may have difficulty in finding
them.
• Finally, TwoFace is recall-focused. The goal of uncovering review manipulators is to identify
as many as possible out of the entire space of reviewers, in contrast to precision-focused ap-
proaches that may miss the vast majority of manipulators. we assume system operators can
expend resources to further examine these potential manipulators.
3.2.3 Propagating Suspiciousness
In this and the following section, we propose two complementary perspectives on propagating
the suspiciousness of a known suspicious user. The first – based on a traditional random walk over
the user-user graph – exploits the locality of suspiciousness within the graph. The main intuition
is that suspicious users will tend to cluster in the graph. The second – based on recent advances in
network embeddings – exploits the structure of the graph around suspicious users. So even if two
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users are distant in the graph, they may be considered similar in terms of their malicious activities.
Intuitively, the campaign network structure around fraudulent reviewers in a site like Amazon may
be similar even if the specific reviewers have not been encountered before.
Reviewer-Reviewer Graph. The approach is built on reviewer-reviewer interactions. These inter-
actions are mapped to a co-review graph in which each reviewer is represented as a node and if two
reviewers write a review on the same product, then there exists an edge between them. Formally,
we model the reviewer network as a graph G = (V,E) wherein V is a set of reviewers and E is a
set of undirected edges that connect reviewers. In the experiments (see Section 3.2.5), we consider
two scenarios: un-weighted and weighted edges. In the first setting, if two users ui and uj (i 6= j)
have written reviews on multiple common products, this connection is represented as a single edge.
In the second setting, we represent the number of common products as a weight value for the edge
w(ui, uj).
The number of nodes connected to user u is its degreeD(u). The co-review matrix correspond-
ing to the un-weighted graph is calculated as:
m(ui, uj) =

0 if (ui, uj) /∈ E
1
D(ui)
if(ui, uj) ∈ E
Accordingly, the co-review matrix corresponding to weighted graph is calculated as:
m(ui, uj) =





if(ui, uj) ∈ E
Note that the values in each matrix are normalized transition probabilities.
Random Walk Propagation. The proposed approach for propagating suspiciousness is inspired
by the TrustRank algorithm proposed in [48]. we aim to compute a suspiciousness score for each
user based on their connectivity to other users in the co-review graph. The intuition is that fraud-
ulent users write reviews on similar products, so they may form a dense sub-graph of suspicious
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reviewers.
The input to the algorithm is the co-review matrix (m), a seed set (s), teleportation parameter
(α), the number of iterations (n), and the number of nodes (|V |). The output is a suspiciousness
vector (r).
Algorithm 1 Suspiciousness Rank
1: e = 0|V | //Restart Vector
2: for i = 1 to |V | do
3: if ui ∈ s then
4: e(i) = 1
5: e = e|e|
6: r = e
7: for j = 1 to n do
8: r = α.mT .r + (1− α).e
9: return r
The restart vector e is initialized in steps 2-4 based on the seed set, i.e, the values are one in
the corresponding indices of seed set items and zero in other places. Step 5 computes the l1 norm
of vector e so that the aggregate sum of the vector is equal to 1. In step 6, the suspiciousness score
vector r is initialized to e. Finally, the scores are calculated in steps 7-8 using a biased PageRank
with e as a restart vector referring to the seed set of fraudulent reviewers.
In each iteration, the suspiciousness score of a node propagates among its neighbors and is
dampened by the teleportation factor α. The score vector r shows the probability of reaching each
node when the random walk, rooted at one of the nodes in the seed set, is traversing the graph.
In other words, the final scores measure how relatively close a node is to the initial seeds. This
approach ranks reviewers based on their level of suspiciousness and suggests reviewers that should
be examined further by an expert.
Seed Selection. A key question is how the seeds for the random walk propagation are selected
in the first place. First,we need to identify a small set of users as seeds that we certainly know
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are fraudulent and then propagate their suspiciousness to other users using iterative approaches.
In some works, e.g., [48], initial seeds are selected based on human judgment. Here, we consider
three different scenarios for seed selection that could arise in practice:
• If we find a user with tens of reviews on targeted products and notice that all of his purchase
statuses are unverified, then we conclude that this user is a critical player working on behalf of
crowdsourcing websites. We call such reviewers highly malicious users. Therefore, we pick
reviewers with the maximum number of such reviews as seeds. The intuition is that such re-
viewers may be connected directly to other potential fraudulent reviewers in the co-review graph.
Therefore, propagating their suspiciousness would lead to identifying fraudulent reviewers more
accurately. We call this approach the “best” choice of seeds.
• The second approach is to pick a few number of fraudulent reviewers randomly and propagate
their suspiciousness. This approach is more indicative of real-world scenarios since we are not
always guaranteed to have found the best (most connected) reviewers. For example, malicious
users might use different accounts to write fake reviews in order to avoid detection models. We
call this approach the “random" choice of seeds.
• The third approach is to pick a few number of fraudulent reviewers randomly among reviewers
with only a few reviews on target products. The intuition here is that a system operator at a user
review site like Amazon may have discovered some fraudulent reviewers, but only the weakest
connected ones. How well does the suspiciousness propagation work in this case? We call this
approach the “worst” choice of seeds.
In practice, we find that there is a great variance in the quality of seed selection approaches.
To illustrate, Figure 3.6 shows the Precision@k over the top-k ranked reviewers when we initialize
the suspiciousness propagation algorithm with seeds from the best, random, and worst cases. In
the real-world cases of random and worst, we see that the fraction of reviewers that are actually
fraudulent drops precipitously with an increase in k. That is, while there may be some localness in
the co-reviewer graph which helps identify nearby fraudulent reviewers, many fraudulent reviewers
are not closely connected to the seeds (hence, the low precision@k as k grows). We do see that
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Best Choice Random Choice Worst Choice
Figure 3.6: Precision@k for different seed selection approaches.
in the extreme case of picking the most prolific seeds (which we argue is rare in practice), there is
good locality and good precision@k. Even so, for large choices of k, the quality drops off too.
3.2.4 Uncovering Distant Users
While traditional random walk methods exploit the locality of suspiciousness within the graph,
they may miss reviewers who are not closely connected to the original seeds. In particular, in
crowdsourcing scenarios, different fraudulent users may participate in different crowdsourcing
tasks, so there would not be a direct link between them. Therefore, we need more sophisticated
models to capture this relationship. In this section, we adapt a framework for learning feature
representations of nodes in the network. Concretely, we explore using network embeddings to
classify similar nodes even if two users are not directly connected but may have the same structural
role in the graph. For example, Figure 3.7 shows that even though node 5 and node 10 act in two
distinct communities, they play the same structural role in their own community.
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Figure 3.7: Same structural role in distinct communities. Here nodes 5 and 10 serve similar roles
as we surmise different crowd campaigns may also be organized.
Reviewer Graph Embeddings. In node classification, the goal is to predict the most accurate
labels for the nodes [85]. On the other hand, in supervised machine learning approaches, a set of
informative features is required. When it comes to the problem of node classification in networks,
it means feature representation of the nodes is required. The idea of network feature learning is
inspired by the recent advances in natural language processing [86] such as the Skip-gram model.
In summary, the Skip-gram algorithm goes over the words in a document, and builds a feature
vector – the word embedding– for every word in the vocabulary such that it can predict its nearby
words (i.e., words within a window). The continuous feature representation of words are learned by
optimizing the likelihood objective function – Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) – and is based
on the distributional hypothesis which declares words in similar contexts tend to be semantically
similar [87]. In essence, similar words tend to have similar word neighborhoods.
Inspired by the Skip-gram model, a few recent works have proposed models for feature learning
from networks where a network is “document” and the nodes are treated as “words” [88, 89, 90].
Similar to a document that is an ordered sequence of words, a network can be turned into an ordered
sequence of nodes.
We adapt the recent learning approach proposed in [90] in which feature learning in networks
is formulated as a maximum likelihood optimization problem. Function f :→ Rd maps nodes to
their feature representation which are used in classification tasks later on. d indicates the number of
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dimensions of the feature vector, so f is a matrix of size |V |×d. For each node u ∈ V , N(u) ⊂ V
is the set of its neighborhoods. Depending on the neighborhood sampling strategy, N(u) includes
either immediate, embedding, or mixture neighbors. The goal is to optimize the objective function





This function maximizes the log-probability of observing N(u) as the neighborhood of node
u given its feature representation f(u). In our case, each node is a reviewer. Assuming the prob-
ability of observing ni in neighborhood of u is independent from observing any other node in the





Moreover, node u and its neighbors ni have equal effect over each other in the feature space.


















The remainder is to wisely determine neighborhood nodes i.e., N(u). The notion of neighbor-
hood in a text document is defined by a sliding window over sequential words. However, due to
the nature of networks, they do not have such a linear representation and a new notion of neighbor-
hood is needed. Grover et. al in [90] proposed an efficient sampling strategy known as node2vec.
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Traditional neighborhood sampling approaches are Breadth-first Sampling (BFS) and Depth-first
Sampling (DFS). BFS samples nodes which are in immediate neighborhood of node u, while DFS
samples ones which are in increasing distance from u. node2vec enables interpolating between
BFS and DFS. Briefly, a biased random walk explores the neighborhood of a node in a mixture of
BFS and DFS ways by tuning two parameters – Return and In-out – parameters. In our case, we
transform each reviewer (node) into an embedding that captures its neighborhood structure.
Putting it all Together. So far, we have suggested two complementary approaches to address
the problem of uncovering fraudulent reviewers. The first one is based on traditional ranking
algorithms which scores users based on their suspiciousness and is completely unsupervised. The
other is an embedding feature representation of the reviewers. Here, we propose to combine these
two approaches into a supervised classification framework:
• First, we take as input our seeds sampled from a crowdsourcing platform. Typically, we may
have one to dozens of seeds.
• Then we propagate the suspiciousness of these reviewers via the random walk.
• After transforming every reviewer into its graph embedding representation, we then train a clas-
sifier where the positive examples (the fraudulent reviewers) are drawn from the ranked list of
suspicious users. The negative examples (the legitimate reviewers) are drawn randomly from a
held out set of reviewers.
3.2.5 Experiments and Discussions
In this section, we first introduce the data labeling approach. Then, we report the results of eval-
uating the complementary methods to identify active users in review manipulation tasks. Finally,
we compare our approach with a number of alternatives.
Ground Truth. In total, Table 3.1 shows the number of reviewers who wrote a review on a specific
number of target products in our dataset (which include 12,212 reviewers in total). For example,
87 reviewers wrote reviews on more than 20 products targeted by the crowdsourcing site. Our
dataset naturally contains a mix of reviewers and their reviews: some are legitimate reviews, some
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(a) All three seed selection approaches. (b) Random selection with error bars.
(c) Worst selection with error bars.
Figure 3.8: Precision@k for un-weighted graph with different seed selection approaches and 5
initial seeds.
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are the result of targeted crowdsourced efforts, while others may also be fraudulent but outside the
purview of our sampling method (e.g., launched via an unobservable channel like private email).
Hence, we create two datasets – one based on a conservative assumption, and one that is a slight
relaxation:
# Targets 1 2 3-5 6-8 9-20 >20
# Reviewers 9,096 1,669 1,093 126 141 87
Table 3.1: Distribution of reviewers based on number of target products they are associated with.
Conservative definition of fraudulent reviewers. we consider a reviewer to be a fraudulent if
they have reviewed two or more products that have been targeted by a crowdsourcing effort. In-
tuitively, workers may aim to maximize their income by participating in many tasks (and hence,
targeting many products). On the other hand, it is unlikely that a random user will write a le-
gitimate review on two different crowdsourcing products in a short period of time, considering
Amazon’s selection of millions of products [91]. Making this conservative assumption, in our
sampled dataset, we identify 1,650 of 38,590 reviewers as fraudulent and label the rest (36,940
reviewers) as non-fraudulent. Note that, 4,565 reviewers labeled as non-fraudulent still wrote one
review on a target product. Of course, there may still be some unknown fraudulent reviewers in this
set of 4,565 reviewers, but it gives us a baseline to compare against the clearly prolific fraudulent
reviewers.
Relaxed definition of fraudulent reviewers. In an alternative way to identify fraudulent users,
we can relax our conservative assumption and instead label all the reviewers associated with crowd-
sourcing products (i.e., 6,215 of 38,590) as fraudulent and label the rest as non-fraudulent. In this
way, any reviewer who has reviewed a targeted product is labeled as fraudulent. While certainly
overstating the number of fraudulent reviewers, this relaxed definition may give us more insights
into the capability of our approach.
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3.2.5.1 Propagating suspiciousness
Revisiting the initial approach to identify fraudulent reviewers by propagating suspiciousness,
we report here an additional experiment where we consider five seed users. Again, we identify
the best, random, and worst choice of seeds. we repeat this selection 20 times (since users are
randomly chosen either from the entire set or from the least connected reviewers) and report in
Figure 3.8 the variation of precision@k for different approaches in picking initial seeds. Here, we
report all three approaches in (a), then we show the random approach with error bars in (b), and
the worst approach with error bars in (c). The variability suggests that seed selection alone cannot
identify fraudulent reviewers. This echoes the previous figure (see Figure 3.6), yet here we see
that the “worst” approach can sometimes do better than random as we increase k. We attribute this
result to the fact that some of the fraudulent reviewers have been more active in crowdsourcing
manipulation in the past and so they are uncovered as actual fraudulent reviewers at k <= 500.
3.2.5.2 TwoFace detection
Given these results, we now turn to evaluating the quality of the end-to-end TwoFace system.
Recall that TwoFace takes as input the seeds, the suspiciousness propagated scores, and the graph
embeddings for the co-review graph.
Choice of Classifier. The first question is what classification algorithm to apply for distinguishing
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent reviewers? Here, we consider six alternatives: logistic
regression, SVM, Naive Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and a one-class version of SVM.
One-class SVM builds a classifier using instances from only one class – fraudulent in our scenario
– and then classifies new instances from both classes. we include this alternative to validate our
use of legitimate reviewers in the training, even though our sample of legitimate reviewers is taken
from a random sample of Amazon (and so, may erroneously include some fraudulent reviewers).
Figure 3.9 shows the performance of different classifiers in the presence of 10% labeled data, where
the results are averaged over 20 runs. we report the Precision and Recall for the Fraudulent class
as well as F1-macro for the whole dataset. It should be noted that the other class which is abundant
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(95% of the dataset) always has high Precision and Recall. We observe that Logistic Regression
and one-class SVM give us higher Recall, 91% and 88% respectively, but Logistic Regression
performs better in Precision. While Random Forest and SVM give higher Precision, 84% and 73%
respectively, they have a poor Recall i.e., many of fraudulent users remain unidentified. Therefore,


















Figure 3.9: Comparing classifiers.
How Many Seeds Do We Need? In practice, the TwoFace system may have access to only a
small fraction of all fraudulent reviewers. Hence, we study here the impact of the number of
fraudulent reviewers on the quality of classification. Specifically, we consider samples of our
entire dataset ranging from 1% to 10% of all reviewers; in this case, 1% corresponds to about 16
fraudulent reviewers and 370 non-fraudulent ones. we additionally consider both the weighted and
unweighted graph for suspiciousness propagation as input to the method. Table 3.2 shows their
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performance in the presence of 1% to 10% of labeled data. As we increase the number of seeds,
Recall increases from 76% to 92% and 83% to 93% in un-weighted and weighted cases respectively
while Precision remains relatively constant – 30% to 35%. This encouraging result shows that
TwoFace can obtain high Recall even in the presence of very few seeds. Since the weighted and
un-weighted cases perform relatively close, we focus the discussion on the un-weighted graph
going forward.
Training 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
un-Weighted Graph
Recall 76 85 88 90 91 91 92 92 92 92
Precision 34 33 32 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
F1-macro 72 71 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Weighted Graph
Recall 83 88 89 89 92 92 92 93 93 93
Precision 35 33 34 34 32 32 32 32 32 32
F1-macro 73 72 72 72 71 71 72 71 71 72
Table 3.2: Increasing the number of seed users available to TwoFace.
The Impact of Suspiciousness Propagation. In an earlier experiment, we saw that suspiciousness
propagation alone is insufficient for uncovering fraudulent reviewers. Here, we investigate the im-
pact of using the highly-ranked reviewers that are output from the suspiciousness ranking approach
as input to our TwoFace classification. That is, do we really need to propagate suspiciousness? Or
can we just use the initial seeds we sample from the crowdsourcing platform alone? In Figure 3.10,
we show the impact of suspiciousness propagation on feature embedding classification. For exam-
ple, if we rely only on the original seeds from the crowdsourcing platform we achieve around 71%
for Recall of fraudulent reviewers; in contrast, if we feed a small number of highly-ranked users
from the suspiciousness propagation algorithm into classifier, we see that Recall jumps to 83%
with just 1% of seeds. This finding demonstrates the importance of propagating the suspiciousness
of these seed users through the random walk over the co-review graph.
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Figure 3.10: Impact of suspiciousness propagation in identifying fraudulent users
Relaxing the Ground Truth. As we can see from Table 3.2 Precision is in the 30% range
which may seem surprising (even though Recall is quite high). This means that many of the
non-fraudulent users have been misclassified as fraudulent, which could burden resources that are
required to further examine these reviewers. To further explore this issue, we evaluate the TwoFace
approach on the alternative “relaxed” ground truth in which every reviewer with at least one review
on a target product is considered as fraudulent. In this alternative scenario, we find in Table 3.3
that precision jumps to 77%, while Recall increases even more to around 90%. This encouraging
result suggests that many of the reviewers who only reviewed one target product historically are
connected to other fraudulent reviewers and may need further examination by an expert.
Comparing with Alternatives. Finally, we compare the proposed TwoFace system with alter-
native methods including classification over traditional features and the state-of-the-art D-cube
method [35]. For traditional features, we take the standard features described in the previous
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Recall Precision F1-macro
Conservative 83 35 72
Relaxed 91 77 89
Table 3.3: Relaxing the ground truth definition.
analysis of fraudulent reviewers, including rating, burstiness of reviews, review length, and self-
similarity. we evaluate a variety of classifiers and report the best results which are from Logistic
Regression. For D-cube – a dense block detection approach – we try many different number of
dense blocks and report its best results when the number of blocks is 30 and 40. For a fair compar-
ison, we also consider the relaxed ground truth for these methods. For TwoFace, we adopt Logistic
Regression and use the highly-ranked users from the suspiciousness propagation as seeds.
Recall Precision F1-macro
TwoFace System 91 77 89
Traditional Features 61 24 54
D-cube [35]/ 30 blks 69 34 50
D-cube [35]/ 40 blks 82 24 64
Table 3.4: Comparison of TwoFace with alternatives.
Table 3.4 shows that TwoFace system outperforms the two other approaches. The low perfor-
mance of traditional features – 61% Recall and 24% Precision – indicates that fraudulent review-
ers do not always behave abnormally and their rating distribution or burstiness might be similar
to non-fraudulent reviewers. On the other hand the D-cube approach [35] which aims to detect
dense blocks, i.e., a group of reviewers who write a review on a specific number of products in a
short time, is the most similar scenario to crowdsourcing manipulation. It takes number of blocks
as input and returns the most dense blocks. As a result, by increasing the number of blocks it
returns more fraudulent reviewers – 82% versus 69% Recall with 40 and 30 blocks respectively.
However, by increasing the number of blocks, we see that many non-fraudulent reviewers will
be misclassified as fraudulent – 24% and 34% Precision. Since crowdsourcing campaigns do not
36
form dense blocks, we see that TwoFace provides the best overall performance with 91% Recall
and 77% Precision.
3.2.6 Conclusion
The TwoFace system explored how monitoring tasks on sites like RapidWorkers can uncover
fraudulent reviewers on sites like Amazon. It complements previous efforts by providing a new
approach for identifying these types of reviewers. The main intuition is to: (i) exploit the locality
of suspiciousness within the graph through a random walk to find suspicious users who tend to
cluster; and (ii) exploit the structure of the graph around suspicious users to uncover campaign
network structures for identifying fraudulent reviewers who are distant in the graph. The results
are encouraging, indicating that TwoFace can indeed uncover many fraudulent reviewers.
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3.3 TOmCAT Framework to Detect Targets of Manipulation
While fake review writers and fake reviews serve as a building block of an attack, the ultimate
goal is often to manipulate a specific target. For example, the target of an attack could be a
product (e.g., an item on Amazon), place (e.g., a restaurant on Yelp), service (e.g., web hosting
service), or issue (e.g., a net neutrality post on FCC.gov). Knowing which products (or services,
etc.) are targets of an attack, we can deploy more resources to defend the target from ongoing
threats (e.g., require additional user verification or enlist more human moderators) and develop
more robust defensive countermeasures for future threats (e.g., by learning patterns of the types
of issues targeted). Furthermore, reviewers may have little or no history, say by using multiple
user accounts to write fake reviews, degrading the impact of network characteristics on uncovering
manipulation. More importantly, understanding fake review behaviors helps us to develop robust
recommendation techniques that diminish the impact of fake reviews on recommendation results.
And yet, it has traditionally been challenging to identify which products (or places, services,
issues) are actually targets of attacks without a gold standard dataset. As explained in Section 3.1,
this dissertation builds a ground truth of Amazon products that have been targeted by crowd review
manipulation attacks.
The main aim is to study the challenge of countering target-oriented crowd attacks in order
to detect the target of attacks, in a complementary direction to approaches that focus on building
blocks of attacks like fake reviews or fake review writers. Concretely, the main contributions are:
1. We identify two target-oriented attack patterns known as: (i) promotion attacks, wherein a
crowd seeks to manipulate the product rating of a new product; and (ii) restoration attacks,
wherein a crowd seeks to counteract a low rating from a legitimate reviewer. (Section 3.3.1)
2. With these attacks in mind, we develop a Target-Oriented Crowd ATtack detection frame-
work called TOmCAT comprising two components: (i) it first formulates crowd attack foot-
prints into a suite of features based only on timing and sequence of product ratings; (ii) it
then embeds attack footprints in a 3-layer neural network, where we find a good success in
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uncovering target products on our original Amazon dataset. (Section 3.3.2)
3. We show that TOmCAT outperforms six unsupervised and supervised baselines that origi-
nally were proposed to detect manipulation at the user/reviewer level. we find that review
manipulation behaves differently at user and product levels. (Section 3.3.3.1)
4. We validate TOmCAT over three additional domains – Yelp, the App Store, and an alter-
native Amazon dataset – where we find that TOmCAT can effectively detect manipulation
patterns in other domains. (Section 3.3.3.2)
5. Although TOmCAT can uncover target products with high accuracy by addressing existing
attacks, strategic attackers can potentially create hard-to-detect behavioral patterns by under-
mining timing-based footprints. Inspired by recent advances in recurrent neural networks,
we further propose a complementary approach to TOmCAT called TOmCATSeq.2 This is
the first exploration of RNN models on rating sequences for review manipulation detection.
(Section 3.3.4)
3.3.1 Target-Oriented Crowd Attacks
We say that a coordinated attack that aims to manipulate a specific target is a target-oriented
crowd attack. Such coordinated attacks have historically been difficult to identify in order to build
a solid ground truth and evaluate corresponding countermeasures. Table 3.5 reports the summary
of the dataset this dissertation curated and is explained in Section 3.1.
To model deception at the item level, a thorough understanding of crowd review manipulation
behavior is required. we observe that these attacks demonstrate the following characteristics which
help to formulate their patterns precisely.
Relatively small campaign size. A group of workers who target a specific product form a crowd
campaign. A majority of the campaigns are small, soliciting between 5 to 10 reviews in total. This
suggests that crowd campaigns do not leave obvious patterns of synchronized behavior that could
aid in their detection.
2The naming is inspired by sequencing nature of RNN models
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Table 3.5: Summary of Our Dataset
# Products # Reviews
Primary Targets 533 33 k
Secondary Targets 3,467 2.6 M
Randomly Sampled 4,000 0.7 M
? DON’T DO IT, February 15, 2018
This is an inferior product. They are miniature, at least half the
size they should be. we don’t know anyone with eyes this small....
? ? ? ? ? Very Very good Product, February 16, 2018
Very Nice product. Love it. Looking very cute. Best deal at best
price. Very must satisfied with product and service.
? ? ? ? ? They really last for a good .., February 17, 2018
These lashes are so easy to use and they really last for a good
while. There’s a learning curve involved to apply them, ......
? ? ? ? ? Eyelashes look very natural, February 17, 2018
I bought it for my girlfriend and she loves it. its a little difficult
to learn how is the right way to put it on, but when you got .....
? ? ? ? ? Looks extremely real!, February 17, 2018
I bought this for my girlfriend and we told her to test whether i
could tell if they are her real eyelashes for fake one, but .....
Figure 3.11: Restoration Attack Example
High-quality reviews. Our fake reviews demonstrate proper grammar and other evidence of
being generated by actual people (and not bots), meaning that existing methods that rely on signals
of poor review quality may be ill-suited to uncover such fake reviews.
Therefore, we focus on crowdsourcing scenarios as a subtle attack where attackers do not leave
obvious manipulation footprints and their human-written reviews make them difficult to detect.
Crowd Attack Types: In proposed dataset, we identify two prominent types of crowd attacks:
Restoration Attacks: If a product receives a low-rate review (1 or 2 stars in a 5-star rating
system) it might be targeted by a crowd attack with highly positive reviews to help restore the
overall rating. Figure 3.11 shows an example of this attack wherein the target product is first rated
low by a 1-star review and then receives a series of 5-star reviews.
Promotion Attacks: In other cases, crowd attacks target newborn products, i.e. immediately
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? ? ? ? ? best shower head we have gotten, August 30, 2017
This multi-functional head helps us relax ourselves during the
bath and gives the feel of taking a spa. we am using it everyday...
? ? ? ? ? Best product..., August 30, 2017
The design of the product is amazing and we absolutely love the
water flow combinations.The water flow settings can be...
? ? ? ? ? very high quality product, August 30, 2017
The water flow settings can be changed easily and a very
high quality product.It has a setting for a very full vigorous...
? ? ? ? ? Multifunction shower.....All in one, August 31, 2017
Multifunction shower is very useful because Three Settings
Water Flow Control For Your Pleasure. In this product ...
? Don’t waste your Money, March 10, 2018
Very cheap quality. After a few days, it became loose and
detached from the hose. The plumbing tape even didn’t help..
Figure 3.12: Promotion Attack Example
after the product is first introduced to Amazon. These early fake reviews aim to promote the
product and encourage actual consumers to make a purchase. Figure 3.12 shows an example of
such a scenario wherein the review thread is initiated by several fake reviews. However, it receives
a low star review a few months later presumably from a true customer.
Initial Observations: Given crowd attacks characteristics and types, we analyze the rating be-
havior of target products versus randomly selected products from three dimensions. Products are
described by their time-series ratings. More formally, for each product p, there is an ordered se-
quence of ratings as Rp = (r1, .., rn) where ri happens earlier than ri+1.
1. Dense Review Behavior: First, we investigate how many reviews may turn up during a
specific window of time w under the two classes of products. By sliding w over a sequence of
reviews, we measure the number of reviews that are written in this interval. Referring to Figure
3.11 which gives an example of restoration attack, fake reviews were written within a time window
of 3 days. Therefore, we set the value of w to be 3, 5 and 7 days. Also, since we observe a
campaign size n is in the range of 5 to 10 reviews, we examine what portion of products receive 5
to 10 reviews within w days. Figure 3.13 summarizes the review behavior across different values
of w and n. Interestingly, a large portion of target products demonstrate dense review behavior.
For example, 78% of target products have received 7 reviews within 5 days while only 40% of
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Figure 3.13: Target products tend to receive higher number of reviews in short time intervals.
random products display such behavior.
2. Low High Rate Behavior: The purpose of restoration attacks is to rebuild the trust in a
product that has been shaken by a negative review. Thus, we investigate low-high rate events, e.g.,
a 5-star review showing up immediately after a 1/2-star review. In total, we found 111, 870 and
29, 205 number of such events in target and random products respectively. That is, target products
are almost four times more vulnerable to this event. However, the existence of this kind of event is
not a strong indicator of anomalous behavior as it could happen naturally due to consumers with
different tastes evaluating a single product significantly differently [92].
To control for this, we measure how fast different products react to a negative review by gauging
the inter-arrival time between sequential low and high ratings. Figure 3.14 shows what portion of
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Figure 3.14: Target products react to low-rate review faster
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these events happens in less than a specific time window w. we set w to be between 0 and 7
days. Interestingly, 71% of events occur in the same day as the negative review is written in target
products while in random products, only 13% of such events happen in the same day.
Rough Estimation of Attack Types: 3,258 products experience low-high rate events. Consider-
ing same day occurrence of such event as baseline, we can say 2,660 out of ,3467 target products
are targeted by restoration attacks. Similarly, 211 of the target products do not experience low-high
rate events where we can say they are only targeted by promotion attacks.
3. Sequential High Ratings Behavior: This analysis counts the number of 5-star reviews im-
mediately following a low-rated review. we set the size of these blocks of 5-star reviews to be
between 5 and 10 with respect to the crowd campaign size. We can see from Figure 3.15 that the
existence of such blocks in target products is about 5 times more likely than among their randomly
selected peers.
3.3.2 Proposed TOmCAT Model
Inspired by these findings, we propose in this section the Target-Oriented Crowd ATtack de-
tection framework (TOmCAT for short). The key intuition is to model targets based only on the
timing and sequencing of product ratings, without access to historical reviewer behavior, reviews,
and network properties. we introduce here the overall framework and a series of crowd attack
footprints.
TOmCAT Structure. It is based on a neural network with three fully-connected layers. The input
layer is fed attack footprints (as we describe next). The output layer has a single unit with labels 0
or 1 for each class of products (target vs. non-target). we use ReLU(x) = max(x, 0) as the activa-
tion function in the hidden layers, a common choice in the literature [93]. The activation function
for the output layer is a Sigmoid function which represents the classification result. Further, we
adopt standard L2 regularization and gradient descent optimization.
We formulate two types of crowd footprints: Micro features, wherein rating behavior is mod-
eled for a given product; and Macro features, wherein the deviation of rating behavior from a
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Micro features codify rating patterns on individual products as follows:
Speed of Low-High Rate Events (SLH): In restoration attacks, the assumption is that target prod-
ucts receive high rate reviews faster to facilitate their rating recovery in the aftermath of a negative
review. This feature is modeled as the average of inter-arrival times (IATs) between sequential low
and high rate reviews.
SLH(p) = avg(IAT (ri, ri+1)|ri ∈ {1, 2} ∧ ri+1 ∈ {5})
Sequential High Ratings (SHR): Next we aim to capture how many 5-star reviews turn up after
a negative review. This feature is modeled as the average number of sequential 5-star reviews
following a low star review. The intuition is that while in target products the number of such
reviews is limited to crowd campaign size, this feature does not carry any constraints in randomly
sampled products.
SHR(p) = avg(k|ri ∈ {1, 2} ∧ ri+1, .., ri+k ∈ {5})
Ratio of High Rating Reviews (RHR): As fake reviews are generated rapidly while in a normal





Variance of Inter-arrival Times (VIT): This last micro feature measures how inter-arrival time
varies among ratings associated to a specific product. The intuition is that target products at some
points of their life receive fake reviews rapidly and then reach an equilibrium state in which they
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no longer exhibit abnormal behavior. we model this behavior by taking the standard deviation
between the median and maximum values of inter-arrival times for each product. This feature has
relatively greater value in target products.
V IT (p) = STD(median(IATs),max(IATs))
3.3.2.2 Macro Features
The macro features consider ratings in the context of a neighborhood of related products to measure
the deviation from a base-model.
Base-model: we use an Amazon dataset [84] including ~83M reviews associated with ~1.5M
products spanning from May 1996 to July 2014 to build the base-model. For example, the average
rating distribution over all products in this dataset could be treated as base rating behavior. How-
ever, different products do not follow similar distributions, e.g., due to different quality, so relying
on a single baseline does not provide a fair comparison. Therefore, we apply k-means clustering on
base distributions to cluster similar samples together and scatter distant ones in different clusters.
Measuring Deviation: we use Kullback-Leiber (KL) divergence to compute the relative entropy
between two probability mass distributions (PMD) similar to proposed approaches in [42, 94].
Formally, the KL-divergence between base-model (M ) and a distribution (P ) of a given product








For example, if M and P are the probability mass distributions of ratings, then Mi and Pi in-
dicate the probability of rating i in the corresponding distributions where 1 ≤ we ≤ 5. The 0
value for KL-divergence means two distributions are identical while larger values indicate higher
discrepancy between them. We refer to the value of KL-divergence as a product’s anomaly score.
Adding the notion of clustering, a direct approach for calculating an anomaly score would be to
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where K, Mk and ρk indicate the number of clusters, probability mass distribution of the center
of the cluster k and proportion of samples in cluster k, respectively. However, the output of the
function is dominated by large clusters. For example, if a new sample is closer to a cluster with
small size and far from large clusters, then the anomaly score becomes large even it is similar to
one of the base behaviors. To address this issue, we modify the distance function to reinforce the
impact of distance rather than cluster size inspired by Inverse Distance Weighting methods.
σ(p) =








We introduce three attribute distributions where their deviations from the base-model form our
macro features.
Rating Distribution: Since crowd review manipulation jobs solicit highly positive reviews, we as-
sume that the rating distribution for target products should be skewed to high ratings. Considering
5-star rating system, rating distribution Pr is the probability mass function [Pr1 , Pr2 , Pr3 , Pr4 , Pr5 ]




Since crowd reviews often appear in a row, investigating inter-dependency behavior provides sig-
nificant information about the existence of manipulation. Inspired by this property, the remaining
macro features model inter-dependency features.
Inter-arrival time Distribution: Since crowd reviews often turn up in short period of time, their
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inter-arrival times deviate from the base-model. Similar to time-stamp, inter-arrival time is not
categorical data, requiring further care. We adapt the approach proposed in [41] to discretize the
value space of continuous attributes. The intuition is that if maximum value of IATs (5 years in
our case) is larger than minimum value (0 day) with an order of magnitude, then the value space is
split logarithmically into d buckets:
d = logbasemax(IAT )
In the experiments, we set the value of the logarithm base to be 2, and as a result the number
of buckets is 15.
Inter-arrival rating Distribution: Since a low-rate reviews can trigger restoration attacks and
crowd reviews are highly rated, there should be a significant difference between two sequential
ratings. We model this property as inter-arrival rating (IAR). The intuition is that the rating gap
in target products reviews is higher than random products. On a 5-star rating system, possible
values for IAR are [−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4] and thus, the probability mass function contains 9
discrete values.
3.3.3 Experiments and Discussions
This section evaluates the impact of different crowd footprints on the TOmCAT approach. Do
macro features work well? Or micro features? We also explore the impact of features based on the
first few reviews (which may be significant for detecting promotion attacks) and temporal-based
features.
Experimental setup: The feed-forward neural network parameters such as hidden layers’ dimen-
sion, regularization parameter λ and learning rate α are chosen via parameter tuning and we report
the best results. Hidden layers are set to be 5 and 7 dimensions. λ and α are set to be 0.8 and
0.02 respectively. I apply normalization on input data to facilitate the convergence process before
feeding them into the neural network. we train the network over 30% of samples and then evaluate
its performance over the remaining 70% samples, where the results are averaged over 20 runs.
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Table 3.6: Performance Evaluation of TOmCAT using Feedforward Neural Network (NN) in Dif-
ferent Settings.
Target Products Random Products
Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1 Acc
Macro Features 83 81 82 81 83 82 82
Micro Features 69 83 75 86 74 79 77
Macro + Micro 86 83 84 82 85 84 84
w/o Early Ratings 81 82 81 82 81 82 81
w/o Temporal 70 69 70 69 70 70 69
Results: Table 3.6 reports the results of TOmCAT for different types of crowd footprints. we report
Precision, Recall and F1 score for each class of products and overall accuracy. we consider all of
the micro features, all of the macro features, and both macro and micro features. As we expected,
the aggregation of micro and macro features performs better in identifying target products with
86% recall and 84% accuracy. In contrast, TOmCAT identifies target products with 83% and 69%
recall in the presence of only macro features and only micro features respectively. It is evident that
a comprehensive detection framework boosts performance.
Further, we consider a special case where we drop all features based on the first few reviews
of all products. Extracting features from the complete series of reviews can successfully model
restoration attacks but it can miss promotion attacks, specifically ones targeting new products. By
definition, these scenarios create circumstances that are not yet optimal for the model to detect.
Therefore, we execute the proposed feature extraction methodology only on the first n reviews in
addition to the complete series of reviews. In the experiments, we set the value of n to be 5 to
cover the majority of this type of attack considering crowd campaign size typically varies from 5
to 10 fake reviews. We see in Table 3.6, fourth row, that performance metrics drop in the absence
of early ratings features confirming the real impact of addressing this scenario. For example, recall
in recognizing target products decreases from 86% to 81%.
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3.3.3.1 Comparison with Baselines
In this section, we compare TOmCAT to six existing baselines which are originally designed
to identify spam-behavior at the user level and we are eager to evaluate their performance at the
product (target) level. These works aim to identify fraudulent users using rating and temporal
features. To evaluate unsupervised approaches, we use precision @k by varying k from 100 to
3,000. To adapt our model with precision @k, we examine the anomaly scores obtained from
Sigmoid activation function at the output layer of the feedforward neural network and then sort the
products in descending order.
• Helpfulness Vote [31]: On Amazon users can provide feedback to the reviews via helpfulness
votes. We assume that target products receive fewer helpfulness votes. This approach uses
the average of helpfulness votes of reviews of each product and ranks them in ascending
order based on their helpfulness score.
• BIRDNEST [41] models temporal gaps and rating deviations.
• edgeCentric [42] also models temporal gaps and rating deviations.
Figure 3.16 illustrates that TOmCAT is superior to its alternatives especially as k increases
acknowledging its capability in identifying most target products. For example, precision varies
from 98% to 87% for different values of k. These results indicate that careful feature modeling can
be important for defending against crowd attacks.
We further compare TOmCAT with the following supervised approaches.
• SpamBehavior [95] uses the average of rating deviation of individual ratings from overall
rating as a feature.
• Spamicity [31] takes review-burstiness and maximum reviews per day as features.
• ICWSM’13 [29] describes each user (or product in our setting) as its fraction of positive
reviews, maximum reviews per day, and average rating deviation.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison with supervised approaches: TOmCAT captures target products with
higher accuracy
For a fair comparison, we applied Logistic Regression (LR) as the classifier used in these
baselines on corresponding feature sets. We report accuracy as the appropriate metric for balanced
datasets. As shown in Figure 3.17, TOmCAT outperforms its alternatives significantly with 81%
accuracy.
We can conclude that baselines that are originally targeted at the reviewer level may miss some
of the subtle behaviors evidenced at the product level. Also, they tend to capture users with clear
patterns of spam-behavior while target products do not show such clear anomalous signals and they
contain mixed legitimate and non-legitimate behaviors as they receive reviews from actual users as
well.
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Table 3.7: Alternative Datasets Description
# Items # Reviews
Amazon [19] 13,449 1,573,555
App store 2,858 304,450
Yelp 174,567 5,261,669
3.3.3.2 Evaluation Over Other Datasets
Here, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach on three other datasets: from
Yelp, the App store, and another existing Amazon dataset [19]. The goal is to detect manipulation
patterns left by crowd attacks at the target level using only timing and sequence of ratings. Hence,
detection at either reviews or reviewers level which aims to investigate textual content or network
behaviors are ruled out. Table 3.7 shows the summary of each dataset in terms of number of items
and number of reviews. It should be noted that we re-apply the feature extraction methodology
and build the base-model over these datasets. Since the main challenge here is lack of ground
truth, we use complementary information e.g., an item could be a target if it received reviews from
suspicious reviewers, to evaluate the results.
Amazon [19]: This dataset has been used for review spam detection since 2007. It includes
information about reviewers as well which we use as the support information to evaluate our model.
we filter out products with fewer than 50 reviews and end up with 13,449 items. Findings: Ranking
items by their anomaly scores (Sigmoid values), we find significant number of items with Sigmoid
score of 1 (~2,000 items) meaning they are extremely similar to our ground truth. For evaluation,
we pulled out 100 of these items randomly and investigated their reviewers. The idea is that if they
have a review written by a suspicious reviewer, then they are potentially a target of manipulation.
We follow the same method to identify suspicious reviewers as explained in section Identifying
Suspicious Reviewers. We observe that 95 out of 100 top-ranked items by our approach do indeed
receive at least one review from suspicious reviewers.
App store: This dataset has been introduced in [96] where it follows similar strategy described
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in this dissertation to identify target mobile Apps that includes 100 primary target Apps and in
total 2,858 Apps. Findings: Evaluating 100 of top-ranked Apps, we find 47 of them are subset of
primary target Apps. we also investigated reviewers associated with these Apps and observed 86
out 100 Apps received at least one review from suspicious reviewers.
Yelp: This dataset is released as part of round 11 of the Yelp challenge in January 2018 3. Find-
ings: Interestingly, ~19,000 items are ranked top with anomaly score of 1. We pulled out 100 of
the top items randomly for further evaluation. Unfortunately, the Yelp dataset only provides in-
formation about items not reviewers, so previous method to identify suspicious reviewers does not
apply here. Therefore, we explored other available meta-data to support our findings. For example,
16 out of 100 businesses are closed now and 59 and 79 of the items received fewer than 10 and
20 helpfulness votes respectively while on average items on Yelp receives 42 helpfulness votes.
In summary, TOmCAT performs well in uncovering target products in our original Amazon dataset.
This framework is also extrapolated on other review platforms. Furthermore, TOmCAT outper-
forms the baselines. Despite its success in addressing existing crowd attacks, it may perform
poorly against strategic attackers who aim to nullify timing-based features. This motivates us to
build upon TOmCAT and propose TOmCATSeq complementary approach benefiting from mini-
mal features.
Table 3.8: TOmCATSeq Performance Evaluation
Target Products Random Products
Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1 Accuracy




As manipulators are constantly evolving their strategy to circumvent new detection methods,
the core TOmCAT footprints may lose their power against potential hard-to-detect attack behav-
iors. Indeed, we find empirically that inter-arrival time plays an important role in detecting manip-
ulation in our dataset. But what if attackers undermine the power of these footprints?
To test this attack strategy, we consider TOmCAT without any temporal features (keeping all other
configurations the same). As reported in Table 3.6(w/o Temporal Features) there is a significant
drop across various performance metrics. For example, recall/precision of target products and
overall accuracy drop from 86/83/84 to 70/69/69 respectively. This indicates the importance of
careful consideration of strategic attacks as the TOmCATSeq strive to address such scenarios.
Costs Borne By Attackers. This suggests that attackers may be able to subvert TOmCAT, though
at some cost. For example, reviews launched by crowd attacks typically show up in a short time
window. However, prolonging inter-arrival time between fake reviews to mimic base-model dis-
tributions and conceal anomaly patterns may affect the ultimate goal of crowd attacks in several
ways: (i) Slowing Down the Recovery Period: As there is a delay between fake reviews, the overall
rating affected by negative ratings will be rebuilt slowly, meaning that potential customers may be
discouraged by the low overall rating. (ii) Receiving Legitimate Low Ratings: Since fake reviews
are posted at a slower rate to avoid detection, other legitimate low ratings have an opportunity to
arrive, diminishing the impact of the crowd attack.
TOmCATSeq Structure. Regardless of the negative consequences to attackers, such strategic
attacks pose serious challenges to the ongoing success of TOmCAT and models built on similar
crowd footprints.The main idea of TOmCATSeq is to exploit only rating patterns via a novel Rating-
based Bidirectional LSTM model. It has two main advantages: First, since it is an end-to-end
model, it avoids the need for carefully designed features, instead learning effective representations
directly from the input sequence data. Second, it only focuses on rating behavior regardless of
their temporal characteristics, meaning that attacks on the timing of ratings are powerless.
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Long Short-Term Memory networks known as LSTM is special type of recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) introduced in [97]. The chain-like nature of RNN naturally fits time-series data
as in our ratings scenario. Despite the advances in language modeling, speech recognition, ma-
chine translation and computer vision using RNN, the power of deep learning in detecting review
manipulation has not been explored yet. In a nutshell, RNNs at each time-step i transfer the cor-
responding input xi along with the information obtained from previous hidden state hi to a new
hidden state hi+1. LSTM is popular form of RNNs due to its capability in remembering long-term
dependencies. Traditional RNN-based models do not perform well on long sequences since they
only reintroduce information a few steps back from the current step. LSTM solves this problem by
designing a more sophisticated hidden states.
Traditionally, LSTM is used for text data in which the input at each time-step is a one-hot
vector of the corresponding word in the sequence. In rating data, we only have 5 possible different
ratings/words so, the vocabulary size is very efficient while that of language models has more than
10K words [98].
We also leverage bidirectional LSTM which provides the capability of taking information from
both earlier and later in the sequence. Crowd attacks properties motivate the practice of bidi-
rectional LSTM in our problem. To figure out the occurrence of a manipulation attack, it is not
sufficient to just investigate the first part of the sequence, since the model requires more informa-
tion than just observing one or more low-rate reviews as an attack trigger. Thus, information from
the other direction of the sequence containing a series of fake reviews is also required. For this
purpose, bidirectional LSTM adds a backward recurrent layer. Hence, TOmCATSeq can detect
abnormal rating patterns by memorizing events from past and future time-steps.
The input to the network is the rating sequence of products representing each rating value as a
one-hot vector. We treat 1 and 2 stars similarly so the vector representation of each rating has only
4 dimensions. We tried with 5 dimensional vectors and results are similar or slightly worse. we
can relate this to the fact that ratings 1 and 2 are treated equally as negative feedback.
TOmCATSeq comprises three layers as Embedding layer, Bi-LSTM layer, and fully connected
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layer. The Embedding layer ecodes the input one-hot vectors into embedding vectors. The output
of the last time-step in the Bi-LSTM layer is fed into the fully connected layer with Sigmoid as
activation function. Furthermore, to prevent over-fitting, we use dropout [99] regularization tech-
nique. In training stage, dropout sets a portion of Bi-LSTM hidden units to zero with a probability
determined by dropout rate.
TOmCATSeq is a binary classifier that learns to classify a rating sequence belongs to a specific
product as target or non-target. More formally, the goal is to learn a classification function f(Rp, θ)
that determines the label of product p, given a set of model parameters θ. In training stage, the
model is fed training instances (Rp, lp), where Rp is rating sequence of product p and lp is the
actual label acquired from the ground truth. We consider the binary cross entropy [93] as loss
function.
3.3.4.1 TOmCATSeq Evaluation
Here, we present the evaluation results of TOmCATSeq.
Experimental setup: we build TOmCATSeq using the Keras framework [100]. The model hyper-
parameters are tuned using grid search. The number of epochs, the size of batches, the size of
embedding layer, and the hidden size of BiLSTM are selected from [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], [4, 8, 16,
32], [8, 16, 32, 64], and [8, 16, 32, 64] respectively. The learning rate and the dropout rate are
selected from [0.01, 0.001, 0.0001] and [0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9] respectively. The parameters of the
network are optimized by employing Adam optimizer [101]. The weights are initialized based on
various number of distributions as uniform, normal and zero. We set the maximum sequence length
to be 150 empirically. Therefore, in the training stage we limit ourselves to items with at most 150
ratings and address shorter ones with zero padding. In the inference stage, sequences longer than
150 ratings are chunked into multiple sequences. However, sequential chunks are not mutually
exclusive but they have some overlap. If that were the case we would miss the crowd attacks
happening on the edge of two chunks because their ratings are divided between two different
sequences. To overcome such trivial but destructive cases, we set the overlap to be 20 ratings (as





































Figure 3.18: Impact of Removing Temporal Features on TOmCAT and TOmCATSeq Performance
possible). In the evaluation stage, if at least one chunk associated to a product is recognized as a
target then the corresponding product is considered as a target product.
Results: we report the evaluation results on testing data in Table 3.8. Briefly, 94% of target prod-
ucts have been captured by TOmCATSeq and 74% of products that are recognized manipulated
are actual target products. Putting it all together, Figure 3.18 demonstrates the performance of
TOmCAT (84%) and how it is affected (69%) when we model attack footprints using only ratings
data. Finally, TOmCATSeq is only 5% worse than when we have all the features and is able to
recover the accuracy (from 69% to 79%) by relying on an end-to-end RNN-based model fed only
rating sequences.
Discussion: The initial evaluation of TOmCATSeq shows promising results relying on rating data
while temporal features are left out. This reinforces the capability of TOmCATSeq in the face
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of strategic attackers who may adopt a normal temporal distribution to circumvent the detection
model. It tells us that even if the attack footprints are not explicit enough to be formulated as hand-
crafted features, TOmCATSeq which is built over BiLSTM can perceive hidden patterns left by
crowd attacks. This also demonstrates the value of our ground truth which can leverage the power
of RNN-based models while unsupervised approaches lack the capability to uncover difficult-to-
detect review manipulation. However, TOmCATSeq has lower precision compared to TOmCAT
(74% v.s. 83%) meaning it misclassifies some non-target products. Of course, strategic attackers
may seek to undermine approaches like TOmCATSeq, so we are engaged in a continuing effort
to defend against future attacks. For example, adaptive attackers [102] can still circumvent TOm-
CATSeq by following legitimate rating behaviors.
3.3.5 Conclusion
The TOmCAT framework uncovers crowd review manipulation attacks on sites like Amazon.
The proposed model – unlike previous efforts that focus on identifying manipulation at the review
or user level – investigates manipulation in the aggregate at the target level. The main contributions
are to: (i) model product review behavior through a set of micro and macro features inspired by
the presence of restoration and promotion attacks; (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of our TOmCAT
model on other online review platforms; and (iii) exploit hidden patterns of manipulation attacks
to defeat strategic attackers by leveraging RNN on rating manipulation scenario for the first time.
Our results are encouraging, indicating that our model can indeed discover many target products.
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4. AI-BASED MANIPULATION
In this chapter, we describe the AI-powered review manipulation strategy which covers the
forth and fifth research objectives of this dissertation. As discussed in the previous chapter, large
crowd-based manipulation campaigns can spread fake reviews in review systems [8, 7, 6, 103].
In these campaigns, a crowd of workers are paid in exchange for positive reviews, showcasing
the potential of marshalling large human workforces to undermine the trustworthiness of online
reviews. Since these reviews are written by humans and paymasters typically require them to
write realistic reviews – e.g., reviews often have to meet a minimum length and contain positive
but not skeptical comments – they often go undetected by modern detection algorithms that focus
on review content. Still, crowd campaigns may leave manipulation traces, e.g., as reviews arrive
synchronized in time [8] or forming a dense community over the large and mostly sparse co-review
graph [7, 35], which can be helpful in their detection.
AI techniques and in particular deep-learning algorithms have become very popular in recent
years, leading to new opportunities for attack organizers to leverage the power of AI to spread fake
reviews on online review sites rather than using crowd workers.
However, this strategy creates new challenges for both manipulators and defenders. On one
hand, generating high quality reviews to be readable by humans is a challenge on its own. On
the other hand, AI removes the cost of paying crowd workers and therefore becomes more scal-
able. It also can control the rate of posting fake reviews, so eliminating the patterns left by crowd
campaigns which can be critical to the success of the proposed models for detecting crowd attacks.
This dissertation identifies a new class of attacks that are transferable across different domains
leveraging recent advances in transfer learning [67]. We develop a universal model that can easily
target new domains for which we have only limited training data, leading to potentially wide-
ranging attacks on review systems. The main idea is to develop a universal model from a large
collection of reviews (say from Yelp) to capture the general properties of the language used in
online reviews and to comprehend the commonly used linguistic patterns.
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Based on this model, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of its effectiveness in gener-
ating high-quality fake reviews. We find that machine learning spam detectors cannot distinguish
synthetic reviews from real reviews. Furthermore, through a user study, we find that human exam-
iners perceive synthetic reviews as real ones, meaning that new neural generative models of fake
reviews pose serious risks to the validity of online review platforms. We compare model-generated
reviews with fake reviews written by crowd workers and find that human examiners cannot distin-
guish between the two. We further compare our approach with state-of-the-art work [4]. Paired
with this troubling attack vector, we propose a new defense mechanism that exploits the distributed
representation of these reviews to distinguish between real and model-generated ones. This RNN-
based discriminator can uncover automated fake reviews with high accuracy. Concretely, the main
contributions are:
1. We introduce a new class of attacks on online review platforms using transfer learning to
automate review generation across different domains. To do this, we propose the framework
DIOR for Domain Independent Online Review generation (Section 4.1)
2. We perform a comprehensive empirical study on the robustness of synthetic reviews against
traditional spam detectors and human examiners. We show that our proposed framework
beats the baselines and competes with crowd written fake reviews (Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
3. We propose a new defense mechanism that leverages the distributed representation of the
reviews to detect synthetic reviews with high accuracy (Section 4.5).
4.1 The Proposed DIOR Framework
In seminal work, Yao et al. [4] presented the current state-of-the-art approach to generate
fake reviews. In a nutshell, this work leverages neural language models to generate synthetic
reviews. The language model is trained over restaurant reviews from Yelp at a character-level
granularity. Once trained, the model generates reviews character by character. We refer to this
model as CharLSTM. CharLSTM generates domain dependent reviews meaning the whole training
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Figure 4.1: DIOR framework to generate domain independent fake reviews.
process needs to be replicated from scratch to generate reviews for any other arbitrary domain (e.g.,
Mobile accessories on Amazon or Apps on App Store and so on). The proposed approach is not
fully automated as it applies a post-processing step (known as customization) which replaces some
generated words with more suitable ones. Also, character-level language models need to capture
longer dependencies and learn spelling in addition to syntax and semantics, so they are likely to
become grammatically more error-prone.
On the other hand, the main advantage of character-level over word-level language modeling
is its significantly smaller vocabulary. However, online reviews tend to be short, and centered
around a limited range of topics determined by the review domain. For example, the quality of
food and service in restaurants on Yelp or the value of a stay reviewed on Airbnb. Therefore, users
typically adopt a limited vocabulary (∼30k) compared to a general language domain (∼300k)
[104], meaning that word-level models could potentially generate high-quality reviews that avoid
traditional traps like misspelling errors.
This dissertation proposes a universal model capable of generating fake reviews at word-level
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granularity and is transferable across different domains. The intuition is that users use similar
language to write reviews on different domains, e.g., I enjoyed the food and I enjoyed using this
App differ only in domain-dependent vocabularies while the surrounding words express similar
semantics. Hence, we can transfer the knowledge obtained during training of the universal model
to conduct learning for any desired target domain efficiently with possibly smaller review samples
as it only needs to adapt to the idiosyncrasies of the target review domain. We consider mobile
accessories reviews on Amazon and mobile App reviews on App store as the target domains.
We first present the design of our proposed framework DIOR for Domain Independent Online
Review generation (Figure 4.1). DIOR comprises two steps: (i) building the universal model; and
(ii) refining to the target domains. The main assumption is to transfer the knowledge from a source
domain with large training samples to a target domain efficiently with possibly smaller number of
samples. Therefore, we pick Yelp as the source model where significant amount of its reviews are
available as described in Table 4.1. We also show empirically how much target training samples
are sufficient to build the transferred model.
4.1.1 Background
We begin with a quick refresher on the basics of language models based on recurrent neural
networks (RNNs) [105, 106, 107] before diving in to the design of DIOR. RNNs build a “mem-
ory” cell [97] to maintain the information about what it has seen from the input sequence so far
and transfer the information to the next time step. An RNN cell is composed of a set of high di-
mensional weights learned during the training stage to capture the dependency among the words
in the training samples.
Training stage. At each time step t, the network takes in the current word wt along with the
current hidden state ht, that encodes the sequence till the time step t, and outputs a distribution
over the vocabulary for the next word. The output distribution essentially describes the probability
of observing each word w′ in the vocabulary given the sequence w(<=t) (P (w′|w1, . . . , wt)). The
output is then compared with the desired output wt+1 that is the next word in the training sequence
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through cross-entropy loss defined as follows:






yt,j log ŷt,j (4.1)
where y is one-hot vector wherein the index corresponding to the desired output word wt+1 is set
to one. ŷ is the model probability vector activated by the softmax function that is interpreted as
the probability distribution over the words. Both y and ŷ are V-dimensional vectors, where V is
the size of vocabulary and T denotes the length of the sequence. The network parameters are then
updated over multiple iterations to minimize the loss value.
Generating stage. This is an auto-regressive approach, where the trained language model can be
used to generate a sequence of words. It begins by taking in the initial hidden state h0 and word
w0. At each time step t, it takes in the word predicted at t− 1 along with the hidden state ht−1 and
predicts the distribution for the next word wt and also updates the hidden state to ht. By feeding
wt back to the model, it produces another probability distribution to predict the next word.
Diversity Control. To control the diversity of predicted words, a hyper-parameter called temper-
ature τ is used in the generating stage by scaling the output vector o before applying the softmax
function. In other words, the logits in the output vector are divided by τ . The softmax function







where ok represents the element of the output vector corresponding to the word at index k in
the vocabulary. When τ is set to be 1, the softmax is directly computed on the logits. Lower
temperatures result in more conservative predictions since it is less likely to pick from unlikely




Given this background, we turn now to the design of DIOR. We first start by building a universal
model over a large collection of user reviews. We use a collection of Yelp reviews. RY indicates
the concatenation of the all reviews in the training set. Since the language model aims to predict
the next word at each time step, the labels are just like the inputs but shifted by one word. For
example, if the input sequence is “we ate at this restaurant” then the language model is trained to
predict “ate at this restaurant” sequentially given the first word (we). Hence, labels are defined as
LY = RY [1 :].
Then, we break down RY into sequences with respect to the number of the time steps (T ) in
the language model. For faster gradient decent update, the resulting sequences are divided into
mini batches with respect to the batch size (bs). Therefore, for a given mini batch b, the input to
the learning algorithm would be matrix XYb of shape T × bs where values represent the reviews
tokens. The label matrix yYb is built similarly over labels L
Y .
We now describe the architecture of the DIOR at time step t which can be generalized for
any time step. It consists of three layers: an Encoder, 3-layer stacked-LSTMs, and Decoder. The
encoder layer uses a trainable matrix (W Ye ) to learn the embedding representation of the input
tokens. The matrix shape is defined by vocabulary size V and embedding size em. The embedding






















The Decoder layer is a linear transformation which decodes the output of the last LSTM layer
(h3t ). However, we use the “Weight Tying" technique that allows sharing of weights between
encoder and decoder layers to reduce the number of learned parameters [108]. Therefore, h3t is
decoded using the transpose of the embedding matrix (W Ye ) and the result vector is activated by
the softmax function to produce the probability distribution over the words in the vocabulary. It
should be noted that the hidden size of the last LSTM layer is set to be equal to the embedding size
em.
ŷ = softmax(h3t × (W Ye )τ )
The output ŷ is then compared with desired labels yYb,t through cross entropy loss as defined in
Equation 4.1 and model parameters are updated accordingly during multiple iterations.
In addition to this architecture, we apply two regularization techniques introduced in [67] to
capture the dependency between words in the language more effectively. These techniques are
centered around fine-tuning the learning rate η i.e., a hyper-parameter that controls how much to
update the model parameters (weights) with respect to the loss gradient.
The first technique called Discriminative Fine-tuning suggests tuning each layer with different
learning rates instead of using a single learning rate through all layers of the model. The intu-
ition is that different layers capture different features [109], so they should be tuned differently.
Considering the update process at time step t:
θYt = θ
Y
t−1 − ηȮθY J(θY )
where θY represents the model parameters, and OθY J(θY ) is the gradient with respect to the cost
function. With this technique, the update process at each layer l would be:
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l(θYt ) = l(θ
Y
t−1)− ηlȮl(θY )J(l(θY ))
The second technique called Slanted triangular learning rates (STLR) suggests that not only
we do need to consider different learning rates for different layers but also that we need to change
the learning rate through the training iterations rather than using a fixed learning rate. The intuition
is that varying the learning rate helps the model converges efficiently. Through this technique, the
learning rate first linearly increases and then linearly decays.
After training, the set of learned model parameters θY are used to generate reviews for our universal
model. Empirically, we will study Yelp as our source model in the following.
4.1.3 Transferred Model
Given this universal model, we now turn to transferring this model to new domains for which
we have only limited training data. In this way, a single learned model can potentially be used
to launch attacks against a host of other review systems. For ease of presentation, we assume in
this section that the target domain is Amazon and indicate the corresponding notations with Am
superscript e.g., θAm denotes the target model parameters. In practice, the target domain could be
any domain for which some reviews can be sampled.
A straightforward approach for transfer learning is to focus on the model’s first encoder layer
and initialize the weights with pre-trained word-embeddings [110, 111] or embedding matrix W Ye
learned for Yelp vocabularies in our case. However, this approach still trains the target language
model from scratch and treats pre-trained word embeddings as fixed parameters.
A recently introduced approach [67] proposes to transfer the knowledge from all the layers to
benefit from source model to the fullest. Hence, we use the same architecture as universal model
comprising an encoder, 3-layer LSTMs, and decoder and initialize the refined model parameters
θAm with the parameters of the universal model θY .
Initialization. The parameters of the Yelp generative model (θY ) are reused as the starting point
for the Amazon generative model. However, the vocabularies are not the same in the two domains,
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Table 4.1: Summary of Review Datasets




rev Len Training Validation
Yelp 318,392 31,514,567 35,394 69 100 286,552 31,840
Amazon 108,664 10,633,295 20,731 49 97 97,797 10,867
App store 231,199 12,131,926 24,614 41 53 208,079 23,120
so the universal embedding matrix W Ye with the shape of |V Y | × |em| cannot be used directly
because the size of the transferred model’s embedding matrix WAme needs to be |V Am| × |em|.
The average over embedding of the common words in the two domains is used to initialize the
unseen words e.g., Amazon domain dependent words.
m = Avg(wie∀wi ∈ V Y ∧ wi ∈ V Am)
WAme = ||wie∀wi ∈ V Y ∧ wi ∈ V Am|| . . . ||m∀wi ∈ V Am ∧ wi /∈ V Y ||
After initialization, the target model is trained using the same set of techniques introduced in
Section 4.1.2. Together, this DIOR model design promises the potential of generating high-quality
reviews at word-level granularity in an inductive transfer-learning framework.
4.2 Experimental Design
Before turning to our empirical study of the proposed DIOR framework, we describe the exper-
imental design. we consider Yelp and Amazon/App Store reviews as the source and target domains
respectively. Each review contains the text of the review, and the rating score in the range of one
to five stars. we present the results based on reviews with positive sentiment, so we keep only the
reviews with 5-star ratings. we split the datasets into training and validation sets with ratio of 90%
and 10%. Four disjoint datasets are used for generating and evaluating synthetic reviews. Table
4.1 summarize the statistics on these datasets.
Yelp. we use the Yelp Challenge Dataset (round 11) released in January 2018.1 This dataset
1https://www.yelp.com/dataset
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Table 4.2: Example of the synthetic five-star reviews at different temperatures.
Temperature Generated Reviews (Yelp)
0.2
I love this place ! we ’ve been here several times and we ’ve never
been disappointed . The food is always fresh and delicious .
The service is always friendly and attentive .
we ’ve been here several times and have never been disappointed .
0.4
I ’ve been to this location twice now and both times we ’ve
been very impressed . we ’ve tried their specialty pizzas
and they ’re all really good . The only problem
is that they ’re not open on sundays . They ’re not open on sundays .
0.8
I ’ve eaten here about 8 times . we ’ve been introduced to this place .
Its always busy and their food is consistently great .
we LOVE their food , hence the name . It is so clean , the staff is so friendly ,
and the food is great . we especially like the
chicken pad thai , volcano roll , and the yellow curry .
Temperature Generated Reviews (Amazon)
0.2
I have been using this case for a few weeks now and we love it ! we have had
this case for about a month now and it is still holding up great ! we have dropped
my phone a few times and the case has protected it perfectly !
we would recommend this case to anyone !
0.4
after reading the reviews we read the reviews and decided to give it a shot .
we am very pleased with the results . The quality is great
, it fits perfectly and we do n’t have any problems with it .
It ’s a great value for the price .
0.8
the case works great ! it has a soft rubber insert that goes over the hard shell .
The hard plastic shell has a soft inner shell and the hard case
is hard plastic . It is very sticky and has not fallen out or dropped or fallen apart .
Temperature Generated Reviews (App store)
0.2
we love this game so much ! it ’s so fun and addicting ! we love the fact that you
can play with friends and family !
0.4
this app is great ! we have been using it for years and it has always been reliable
and reliable . we have been using it for a long time now and it is always reliable .
0.8
this app is a great tool for discovering new things : being able to search for films
and putting reviews on particular items as well as having a way to
download stories from the app .
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contains∼5m reviews targeting∼174k businesses. we extract reviews corresponding to restaurants
and find 318,392 five-star reviews containing 31,514,567 total words and 35,394 unique words, a
sufficiently large dataset to serve as our transfer learning source task.
Amazon. This dataset introduced in [84] includes Amazon product reviews across a variety of
categories. In our evaluation, we focus on the cell-phone accessories category and extract 108,664
five-star reviews with 10,633,295 total words and 20,731 unique words.
App Store. This dataset contains reviews about mobile applications with 231,199 five-star reviews
and 12,131,926 words and 24,614 unique words introduced in [103].
Model-Generated Dataset. This dataset contains the reviews generated by the proposed language
model. The synthetic reviews for Yelp are generated directly from the universal model. The
Amazon and App store generated reviews are results of transferring the domain from Yelp to the
corresponding domain.
Reproducibility. For the sake of generality, we set the hyper-parameters from a singleton set. The
language model has an embedding size of 400, 3 layers, and hidden size of 1,150. It applies Adam
optimizer with β1 = 0.7 and β2 = 0.99. The batch size is set to 64 and the base learning rate for
fine-tuning is set to 0.004. The number of epochs are tuned on the validation set.
Review Generation. To generate reviews, the initial word represents the beginning of the reviews
which we define by a special token < sor >. The generation process continues until the model
predicts the end of the review identified by a special token < eor > or the sequence length be-
comes equal to the median length of the reviews in the corresponding dataset. we set to generate
reviews at temperatures [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0]. Intuitively, generation at low temperatures rein-
forces the difference between the occurrence probability of the words and reduces the chance of
words with lower probability to be predicted. At low temperatures, the model tends to generate
sequences commonly seen in the training data, so it generates repetitive patterns. By increasing
the temperature, rarer words become visible to the predictor at the cost of grammar mistakes and
incoherency. We evaluate quality of the generated reviews at different temperatures and recognize
the optimal temperature value. Samples of generated reviews are shown in Table 4.2. It is notable
71
that generated reviews at temperature 0.2 tend to repeat themselves.
4.3 User Study
In this section, we evaluate the quality of generated reviews from different aspects by conduct-
ing a comprehensive user study. Although metrics such as loss and perplexity values are used to
evaluate the performance of generative models, the real test is to understand how synthetic reviews
are perceived by end users. First, we evaluate the quality of reviews generated by DIOR. Sec-
ond, we evaluate the model-generated reviews against fake reviews written by crowd-based review
manipulators. Third, we compare DIOR with state-of-the-art work [4].
User Study Guidelines. We set up a crowdsourcing user study to examine whether model-
generated reviews are convincing to human readers. We post surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) to assess the reviews. To ensure the quality of responses, we follow a set of guidelines. We
insert a trivial question into each survey, which asks the Turker to check if a mathematical equation
is False or True. This mitigates the risk of blindly answering surveys. Furthermore, we only accept
surveys where the Turker dwelled on the survey for some time (5-7 minutes depending on number
of questions in the survey). We also restrict our tasks to those who are located in the United States
to guarantee English literacy.
4.3.1 DIOR Reviews
The main aim of the first user study is to evaluate the quality of DIOR generated reviews
by analyzing how they are perceived by end users. To do this, for each domain, we design 100
surveys each with 10 reviews out of which 5 are real reviews and 5 are synthetic reviews, each
generated at one of [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0] temperatures. Each unique survey is assigned to 3
workers (3 HITs2 per task), giving us a total of 300 surveys. We provide an instruction on top of
the survey highlighting two main points; 1) Turkers are tasked to mark each review as either real or
fake. And, for those recognized as fake, they are asked to provide their reasoning using keywords
like “repetition", “grammar issue" and “nonsense"; 2) it also shows a sample of real reviews to
2Human Intelligence Task
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Figure 4.2: Sample of the survey to evaluate quality of DIOR reviews by end users
the Turkers indicating that online reviews are not necessarily well-structured pieces of text. This
prevents many real reviews from being marked as fake due to their informal language. An example
of the survey is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the performance of synthetic reviews against human judgment at var-
ious temperatures. The key point is that such reviews remain quite robust and many of them are
recognized as real. Under the best configuration in Yelp, i.e., temperatures 0.6 and 0.8 the percent-
age of reviews flagged as real is 76.42% and 78.42% respectively. At the same time 89.52% of
real reviews are labeled correctly showing a 10% error while they are supposed to pass the human
test perfectly. We can relate this to the fact that user-written reviews could be also error-prone on
any basis making it a challenge to humans to distinguish between these two types of reviews. In
addition, similar to algorithmic evaluation, the DIOR performance improves with the increase in
the temperature.
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Figure 4.3: Majority of the synthetic reviews at temperatures 0.6 and 0.8 are recognized as real.
Dot lines indicate percentage of real reviews that were labeled as real by humans.
By examining Turkers’ reasoning while they flag a review as synthetic, we find that many
reviews at low temperatures e.g., 0.2 and 0.4 are identified as fake due to repetition and they sound
robotic even though they are grammatically correct. On the other hand, the performance of such
reviews improves at higher temperatures.
However, we can observe a downfall of the accuracy at temperature 1.0 as examiners believe
the reviews may not be coherent and contain a nonsensical argument. We can recognize the best
performance occurs at temperature 0.8.A similar pattern is observable in both other domains. In
summary, Reviews generated at this temperature can fool human readers and go undetected. And,
Human readers are more sensitive to repetition errors than they are to small grammar mistakes.
Hence, in the following studies (Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.4.1), we focus on reviews generated
at temperature 0.8 as it is demonstrated to be the optimal threshold for generating reliable reviews
understood by humans.
4.3.2 DIOR versus Crowd Manipulators
The first major thrust of this dissertation is to investigate crowd-based manipulation. Here, the
research objective is to compare the power of AI-based manipulation with that of crowd enabled
attacks. As a reminder, in crowd-based manipulation, a crowd of workers are paid in exchange of
positive reviews. Here we aim to evaluate how end users perceive the fake reviews generated by
proposed DIOR approach compared with those written by crowd manipulators. This study answers
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Figure 4.4: Sample of the survey to evaluate quality of DIOR reviews versus crowd written reviews
the important question of whether AI is capable enough to take the place of the crowd campaigns?
We first prepare a ground-truth of crowd written fake reviews. This dissertation introduces a
dataset of crowd-based manipulation traces on Amazon [7]. However, the focus of crowd-based
manipulation thrust is to detect manipulators and targets of manipulation not to identify individual
reviews as fake or real. Therefore, we label reviews as fake using the notion of self-plagiarism
[8] in which a manipulators simply duplicate a single review on two different products. From this
pool of fake reviews, we filter out reviews about mobile accessories for the fair comparison with
the Amazon synthetic reviews.
Second, we design 20 surveys each with five pair of reviews each generated by either crowd
manipulators or DIOR framework. Each unique survey is assigned to 3 Turkers (3 HITs per task),
giving us a total of 300 (20 × 5 × 3) pairs of reviews. They are tasked to select which of the two
reviews sound fake to them or none if they find them to be equally reliable. An example of the
survey is shown in Figure 4.4.
As Figure 4.5 shows, both crowd and model generated reviews are equally likely to be detected
by human evaluators as fake. For example, 32% and 31% of the answers found crowd written
fake reviews and reviews generated by DIOR as suspicious respectively while 37% of the answers








Figure 4.5: Users perceive DIOR generated reviews as reliable as crowd written fake reviews.
DIOR as reliable as fake reviews written by manipulation campaigns.
4.3.3 DIOR versus the state-of-the-art Model
This section compares the effectiveness of the proposed DIOR model to the state-of-the-art
work [4]. In summary, CharLSTM is a two-layer character-based LSTM trained over Yelp chal-
lenge dataset and generates restaurant reviews. However, the implementation code or a sample
of fake reviews generated by this model is not publicly available. Hence, we replicate the model
as closely as we could based on the configurations reported in the paper (Section 3.2 Training
Process).
Now we conduct a user-study and design 20 surveys each with 20 reviews out of which 12
are real reviews, 4 are fake reviews generated by CharLSTM and 4 are fake reviews generated
by DIOR. Each unique survey is assigned to 3 Turkers (3 HITs per task), giving us a total of 60
surveys and 1200 (20× 20× 3) reviews. Each participant is tasked to label four reviews as fake.
On average, the detection rate (recall) is 28% and 45% for reviews generated from DIOR and
CharLSTM respectively. Figure 4.6 shows that DIOR generated reviews go undetected with higher





















Figure 4.6: Comparison with baseline.
effective reviews.
4.4 Impact of Transfer Learning
In this section, we investigate the impact of transfer learning from performance and resource
efficiency points of views. First, how it improves the quality of synthetic reviews compared to
individual models. Second, how much data is needed to refine the universal model. Overall, we
aim to show advanced language models make it easier to manipulate review platforms.
4.4.1 Performance: Transferred versus Individual Models
In this study, we evaluate the quality of reviews generated from the transferred model against
reviews generated from a language model trained from scratch – what we refer to as the individual
model for our target domains. To do this, we set up a pair-wise comparison based on a survey-based
user study to see how natural reviews generated by two models sound to human readers.
For each target domain, we design five surveys each with five pair of reviews. Each unique
survey is assigned to 10 Turkers, giving us a total of 50 surveys and 250 pairs of reviews. The task
is to select which of the two reviews sound more natural or both if they find them to be equally
natural. An example of the survey is shown in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Sample of the survey to evaluate quality of reviews generated by transferred and indi-
vidual models
Figure 4.8: Users find reviews generated by transferred models more convincing than those gener-
ated by individual models
To ensure that users evaluate reviews based on only the language of the review, we pair reviews
with a similar topic for each comparison. For example, both reviews talk about fitness applications
in the App domain or headsets in the Amazon domain. As Figure 4.8 shows, for the App store,
human readers found 57% of the reviews generated from the transferred model to sound natural
as opposed to only 21% of reviews generated by individual model. 21% of responses found both
reviews to sound equally natural. We find similar results for Amazon. To conclude, using transfer
learning not only facilitate the domain shift but also improves the performance significantly.
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Figure 4.9: The transferred models need reasonably low number of samples to reach stable perfor-
mance.
4.4.2 Resource Efficiency: Training Size
It is critical to understand the resources needed to refine the universal model. In particular,
when the target domain’s dataset is not sufficiently large we are eager to know how many reviews
are required for the model to converge. we plot the validation loss versus training size for Amazon
and App transferred models in Figure 4.9. We gradually increase the training size starting with
25k reviews. According to this figure, we need approximately 100k and 75k training reviews for
App and Amazon domains respectively to converge the loss values and achieve a relatively stable
performance. In the Amazon domain, the model converges with a smaller set of reviews and we can
relate this trend to the size of the vocabulary. According to Table 4.1, there are about 20k unique
words in Amazon (less than that of App store with 24k unique words) which helps the model to
adapt to the domain more efficiently. To conclude, the transferred models need reasonably low
number of samples compared to universal model to reach stable performance.
In summary, we showed that automating generation of fake reviews can expose serious threats
to review platforms through different studies. However, despite the success of DIOR in generating
79
Table 4.3: Performance of spam detector. From temperature 0.8 synthetic and real reviews become
indistinguishable
Yelp Amazon App store
Temp 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Acc (%) 92 81 73 64 55 92 82 75 61 56 91 77 69 62 54
Prec (%) 93 82 74 65 56 93 83 76 64 57 92 80 71 62 55
Rec (%) 93 82 74 65 55 92 82 75 61 56 91 78 70 62 54
F1 (%) 93 82 74 65 54 91 82 75 60 54 91 77 69 62 53
realistic reviews, in the next section, we propose a new defense mechanism to combat this threat.
4.5 Proposed Discriminator for Detection
Although model-generated reviews successfully pass the human tests, the question is whether
RNN-based language models manage to model the real review distribution? To answer this ques-
tion, we propose a discriminator capable of distinguishing synthetic reviews from real ones using
the underlying distributed representation of the review words learned during the training process
of the language model. Before turning into describing the discriminator, we first develop a textual
classifier that is the base model to detect spam text as the baseline to evaluate the performance of
the discriminator.
4.5.1 Baseline: Spam Detector
Here we develop a machine-learning scheme to evaluate if model-generated reviews carry dif-
ferent linguistic patterns from real reviews. Text classification has been widely used to detect
opinion spam on the web [19, 29, 38]. We describe four groups of linguistic features consisting of
12 features in total, following the approach proposed in [4] to classify the reviews.
Similarity feature (1): Measures the inter-sentence similarity within a review. It computes the
cosine-similarity between each pair of sentences based on their unigram tokens and considers the
maximum value as the similarity feature [112].
Structural features (2): Captures the structural aspects of a review including the average sen-
tences length measured by their number of words and the average word length measured by their
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number of characters [30].
Syntactic features (5): Defines linguistics properties of a review based on parts-of-speech (POS)
tagging process. It includes percentage of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns [30].
Semantic features (4): Captures the sentiment and subjectivity of a review including percentage
of positive, negative, subjective, and objective words. we use SentiWordNet library [113] to extract
this type of feature.
For each domain and at each of the temperatures, we sample 10k model-generated reviews and
10k real reviews, for a total of 20k reviews. we split this data into training and testing sets with a
ratio of 70% and 30% respectively. we train an SVM classifier with rbf kernel and c=1 (obtained
from [0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10] set through grid-search). After training over all 12 linguistic features,
we test the performance of the classifier over the testing data. Results are averages of 10 runs. It
should be noted that we tried different classifiers such as Logistic Regression and Linear SVM and
observe similar results. Hence, we report the results obtained from SVM as representative standard
machine learning classifier.
The evaluation metrics are average of precision, recall and F1-score over both classes of re-
views and overall accuracy. Table 4.3 reports the performance of the classifier at different tem-
peratures across different domains. We observe that text classification shows high detection per-
formance at lower temperatures. For example, at temperature 0.2 it classifies reviews with 0.92,
0.92, and 0.91 accuracy in Yelp, Amazon, and the App store domains respectively. We can relate
this trend to the fact that reviews generated at lower temperatures tend to repeat themselves (Table
4.2), which makes features like inter-sentence similarity an informative feature to distinguish two
class of reviews.
However, we aim to evaluate the performance at temperature 0.8 as we find this to be an optimal
temperature in a qualitative analysis by human readers (Section 4.3.1). We observe that model-
generated reviews can circumvent the linguistic-based test when an appropriate temperature is
selected. Low evaluation metrics at temperature 0.8 – e.g., 0.64, 0.61 and 0.62 accuracy across
Yelp, Amazon, and the App store respectively – indicate synthetic reviews do not resemble spam
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behavior. In summary, the linguistic-based spam detector may not distinguish synthetic reviews
from real reviews.
4.5.2 Discriminator
The key insight is that language models predict the next word conditioned on previously seen
words while humans are not restricted by this requirement when they write online reviews. Fig-
ure 4.10 visualizes the review embeddings over 400 Yelp review samples in two dimensions using
t-SNE [114], with markers corresponding to synthetic and real reviews. Note that the review em-
bedding is computed by composing their word embeddings. we adapt a straightforward approach
that represents a review by taking the average over its word embeddings [86]. As we can see from
Figure 4.10, synthetic reviews tend to cluster together in the embedding space in particular at low
temperatures.
This motivates to explore the manner of words appearing in a sequence in synthetic and real
reviews. The proposed discriminator learns a classifier M(R, θ) that classifies a review R as real
or synthetic given its terms and model parameters θ. A bipartite training sample consists of (i)
embedding representation of review terms {ξ(w1), ..., ξ(w|R|)} extracted from embedding matrix
We (Section 4.1); and (ii) its corresponding label y i.e., 1 or 0 indicating synthetic and real reviews
respectively. For a given batch of training samples b, the loss function based on cross-entropy is
defined as follows:
J(b; θ) = 1|b|
∑|b|
i=1 yi log(M(Ri, θ)) + (1− yi) log(1−M(Ri, θ))
Where M(Ri, θ) and yi indicate the predicted and actual labels of review Ri respectively.
Network Architecture. we opt for a straightforward LSTM network which is composed of: LSTM
and linear layers. The LSTM is fed distributed representations of review terms (term embedding
for short) and the output of the last hidden state is fed to the linear layer where it is activated by
the softmax function and outputs the classification result.
Experimental Setup. For each domain and at each temperature, we sample 10k model-generated
reviews and 10k real reviews from the training dataset, in total 20k reviews. we split the data into
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training, validation, and testing datasets with the ratio of 80%, 10%, and 10% respectively.
Reproducibility. To evaluate our key insight, we avoid setting up a highly tuned network and
choose the hyper-parameters from singleton sets. we set the number of LSTM hidden states with
respect to the median of review length in each domain (Table 4.1). we set input size, hidden size,
learning rate, dropout rate, batch size, hidden layers, and optimizer to 400, 1150, 0.001, 0.1, 16, 2,
and Adam respectively. we only tune the number of epochs based on the performance of the model
on the validation dataset. That is, as accuracy on the validation set decreases the training process
would stop to prevent the model from over-fitting.
Synthetic Real
(a) Temperature 0.4 (b) Temperature 0.8
Figure 4.10: Generated reviews tend to cluster in the embedding space. Figure best viewed in
color. (Yelp)
Results. Figure 4.11 shows the detection performance across different domains at different temper-
atures. Due to the balanced dataset (equal representation of two classes) other evaluation metrics
like recall, precision and f1-score remain similar to accuracy, so we only report the accuracy. The
discriminator achieves significantly high accuracy at low temperatures [0.2, 0.4, 0.6] that is 0.99,
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
(b) Amazon
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
(c) App Store
Figure 4.11: The proposed discriminator detects synthetic reviews with high accuracy and per-
forms significantly better than textual classifier.
0.99 and 0.97 on Yelp and a similar pattern is observable over other domains. However, we evaluate
its performance at temperature 0.8 that is demonstrated to be the optimal temperature in the qual-
itative analysis. At this temperature, the discriminator is able to identify model-generated reviews
with 0.92, 0.89 and 0.86 accuracy across different domains while the corresponding values ob-
tained from the baseline textual classifier (spam detector) is 0.64, 0.62 and 0.61. These promising
results motivate to consider more complex architectures as a future direction for the discriminator
to detect model-generated reviews at temperature 0.8 more accurately in order to minimize the
impact of automated fake reviews. In summary, model-generated reviews are detectable in the
embedding space with high accuracy.
4.6 Conclusion
The DIOR framework proposed and evaluated a wide-ranging class of attacks on online review
platforms based on neural language models at word-level granularity using transfer-learning. The
unique attribute of this work is its domain independence, so that it can target any arbitrary review
domain even with only small available review samples. The main intuition is to: (i) develop a
universal model to learn general linguistic patterns in review domain and transfer this knowledge
to the domain-specific language; (ii) generate high quality reviews which are competitive with real
reviews and can pass the quality test by both computational-based detectors and human evaluators;
(iii) demonstrate that synthetic reviews do not completely mimic the true distribution of real re-
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views, so this is a powerful signal to detect automated fake reviews. The results on discriminating
generated reviews are promising and model-generated fake reviews can be detected with about
90% accuracy.
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5. SOPHISTICATED CLASS OF MANIPULATIONS
Investigating AI-based manipulation, we face a new challenge that motivates us to develop new
generative models in order to control the topic and sentiment of generated reviews. Although DIOR
shows success in generating grammatically correct, meaningful and human-readable reviews, the
reviews do not necessarily reflect important topics and sentiments that users often express. It
should be noted that content in review platforms are personalized for each item or service rather
than the same content being duplicated across different items or services. To make the manipu-
lation process more realistic, we validate a new approach wherein the topic and sentiment of the
target are taken into account while generating the reviews. The focus of this piece is to model and
evaluate topic-aware reviews.
Sequence-to-sequence architectures have been proposed to generate natural text conditioned
on the characteristics defined by the first sequence in an end-to-end manner. To name a few, works
in question answering [79], conversational modeling [115] and translation [80] adopt the paradigm
of sequence-to-sequence architecture.
Despite this promising progress in sequence-to-sequence problem domains, such advances
have not been explored in aspect-aware review generation primarily due to the data bottleneck.
Learning a deep neural review generator requires large amounts of labeled data. While there are
many existing collections of online reviews, very few have labels at the granularity of aspects
(like price, food quality, or decor) and with sentiment associated with these aspects. Furthermore,
it is unclear if incorporating such aspect and sentiment into a review generator would result in
meaningful reviews.
In this dissertation, we explore how to make use of weak supervision to expand a small set of
review segments labeled with aspects and sentiments (known as the seed set) to a large amount of
unlabeled review segments demanded by data-hungry neural networks. In particular, we propose
and evaluate a new framework to label and generate aspect dependent online reviews, named
ADORE. We develop a weak labeling methodology that leverages the underlying distribution of
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the reviews to infer weak (or noisy) labels. Since users express opinion on different aspects of the
target in a single review, a review cannot be labeled in whole to state a specific aspect (see Figure
5.1). We propose a segmentation algorithm to split a review into its topically coherent segments
and aim to label the resulting segments.
By overcoming this data bottleneck, we then show how to use these labels to train a generative
model as if the ground truth labels are already available. In essence, this work aims to bridge
aspect-mining and generative networks to generate product reviews conditioned on a specific as-
pect and sentiment. The proposed joint model encodes the aspect and sentiment that guides the
review generator. Moving forward, we use aspect to refer to the combination of aspect and sen-
timent attributes. We employ a regularization technique into the language model to enhance its
performance by giving rare words a proper probability to become visible to the generator. We also
utilize an attention mechanism to reinforce the impact of the aspect encoder in predicting the next
word.
We thoroughly analyze the ADORE framework using Yelp restaurant reviews to understand
how effective is our weak labeling methodology, what is the optimal point for review segmentation
to mitigate the adverse impact of the noise-prone nature of the labeling process, how our proposed
approach performs compared to the baselines, and how much training data is required to reach a
stable performance. We evaluate the quality of the generated reviews through a user-based study.
We employ an ablation study to evaluate the impact of regularization technique on quality of the
generated reviews. Concretely, the main contributions here are:
1. We develop a weak labeling methodology to build an aspect-aware review dataset and eval-
uate the effectiveness of our approach using crowd-sourced annotation.
2. We propose a joint model that learns to generate aspect-aware reviews in an end-to-end
manner.
3. We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed framework, including through user-based ap-
proaches.
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Went in for a lunch . steak sandwich was delicious , and the caesar 
salad had an absolutely delicious dressing , with a perfect amount of 
dressing , and distributed perfectly across each leaf . I know i 'm 
going on about the salad ... but it was perfect .
 
Drink prices were pretty good .       The server , dawn , was 
friendly and accommodating . very happy with her .                  





Figure 5.1: Example of Review Segmentation- A single review discusses different aspects of an
item
5.1 The Proposed ADORE Framework
We propose a weak labeling methodology leveraging the underlying distribution of the reviews.
Our weak labeler comprises two fundamental components: (i) review segmentation; and (ii) label
assignment. Before proceeding with this approach, we pre-train a word2vec model over a large
corpus of Yelp restaurant reviews (see Section 5.3.1) to obtain the word embeddings as wi.
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, users express opinions on different aspects of the target, so a review
cannot be labeled in whole to state a specific aspect. On the other hand, users typically describe
an aspect in more than one individual sentence. Therefore, it is vital to detect aspect boundaries
and segment reviews accordingly. In summary, the goal of review segmentation is to aggregate
topically coherent sentences into one segment. The label assignment step aims to identify the
aspect of the segments obtained from the first step using a small set of labeled data.
5.1.1 Review Segmentation
The review segmentation algorithm works at sentence level granularity and traverses through
each review sentence by sentence in order to cluster coherent sentences into one segment. At its
core, review segmentation is based on a sliding window technique with a window size of two. Each
sentence is compared with the rightmost sentence in the previous segment. If their distance is less
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than a specific threshold τ , then the sentence is added to the segment, otherwise it forms a new
segment. This process continues until the end of the review.
The segmentation algorithm is based on a metric to measure the similarity between sequential
sentences. We adopt the Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) [116] due to its performance to measure
semantic similarity between two segments of short text. Rather than relying on keyword matching,
it attempts to find an optimal transformation from one sentence S to another sentence S ′ in the
word embedding space:








Wij = 1/|S|, we ∈ {1, ..., |S|},
n∑
i
Wij = 1/|S ′|, j ∈ {1, ..., |S ′|}
(5.1)
where |S| and |S ′| are the length of each sentence in terms of number of words and Wi,j is the
weight of word i calculated based on a normalized bag of words (nBOW) representation of a
document, so it is equal to 1/|S| from sentence S that is transferred to word j of sentence S ′.
Finally, c(wi, wj) is the traveling cost between two words and is calculated by taking the Euclidean
distance between embedding representation of words.
Algorithm 2 shows the segmentation steps for one specific review R, which can then be gener-
alized to all the reviews in the dataset. We later show how we choose the threshold empirically.
5.1.2 Label Assignment
Now that we split reviews into coherent segments, in this step we attempt to label the segments
at the aspect level. The label assignment algorithm is based on a small set of labeled data known
as the seed set. Table 5.1 reports the statistics of this seed set.
The main intuition is to find semantically similar seeds to the unlabeled segments and use their
labels to identify the aspect of the segments. For this purpose, we compare each sample in the seed
set against the unlabeled segments using the WMD distance function. If their distance is less than
a threshold τ then the segments discuss similar aspects in the semantic space and so the unlabelled
segment receives the same label as the seed sample. Algorithm 3 shows the label assignment steps.
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Figure 5.2: The review segmentation algorithm attempts to split a review into coherent segments
by moving a sliding window over sequential sentences. Blue windows show two sentences are
close in the semantic space, so they are clustered into one segment. Red windows shows the split
point where two sequential sentence belong to different segments.
Algorithm 2 Review Segmentation
1: R : Review
2: S : Sentence
3: segments={ }
4: S = Split (R)
5: currentseg = S1
6: for i = 2 to |S| do
7: d = WMD(Si, currentseg)
8: if d < τ then
9: currentseg+ = Si
10: else
11: segments.add(currentseg)
12: currentseg = Si
13: segments.add(currentseg)
14: return segments
Table 5.1: Distribution of labels in the seed set. (+) and (-) indicate positive and negative senti-




















Count 446 163 102 16 19 24 28 6 407 261 1472
(%) 30.29 11.07 6.92 1.08 1.30 1.63 1.90 0.40 27.64 17.73 100
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Algorithm 3 Label Assignment
1: seed: labeled data
2: seg: unlabeled segment
3: for seed in seedset do
4: for seg in segments do
5: d = WMD(Si, currentseg)
6: if d < τ then
7: label(seg)← label(seed)
8: return label(segments)
Multi-label sentences. With respect to the review segmentation algorithm, the key assumption
is that each sentence or several coherent sentences discuss only one aspect. However, expressing
multiple aspects in a single sentence is a common practice when users write reviews. Table 5.2
shows some examples of such scenarios where there is no optimal point to divide it into individual
parts corresponding to individual aspects. In this piece, we deal with segments with a single aspect
and leave these kinds of multi-aspect segments for future work. For this purpose, we limit our
experiments to the segments that receive only one label by the label assignment algorithm.
Table 5.3 demonstrates examples of segments obtained from the segmentation algorithm and
their labels assigned by the label assignment algorithm across different aspects and sentiments.
5.2 Aspect-aware Review Generation
Given this bootstrapping method for overcoming the data bottleneck, we now focus on a down-
stream task to validate the quality of these labels. Concretely, we show in this section how to
extend recent generative models of text to generate aspect-aware reviews.
The generative model consists of three main components: (i) the aspect encoder; (ii) an attention-
based language model; and (iii) a regularizer to enhance the performance of the generator. In the
following, we explain each of these components in turn. We use aspect to refer to the combination
of both aspect and sentiment.
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5.2.1 Aspect Encoder
The first key component is an aspect encoder that constructs the embedding representation for
each aspect. Given an aspect, we first map them into one-hot vectors A.
Then, we employ a fully-connected gated network to encode the input aspect as zi = α(W.Ai+
b), where zi is the encoder output for aspect Ai, W and b are the weight matrix and the bias vector
for the linear operation respectively and are learnable parameters. α(.) is the non-linear activation
function chosen to be ReLU. We restrict the dimension size of the aspect vectors to be identical
with the generator’s hidden state since they initialize the hidden states.
5.2.2 Attention-based Review Generator
Basically, neural language models [117] recurrently compute hidden states that transfer the
information to the next time step. At each time step t, the network takes in the current word
wt along with the current hidden state ht, that encodes the sequence up to the time step t, and
outputs a distribution over the vocabulary for the next word. The output distribution essentially
describes the probability of observing each word w′ in the vocabulary given the sequence w(<= t)
(P (w′|w1, . . . , wt)).
Table 5.2: Example of sentences with more than one aspect.
Multi-label Review Sentences Labels




prices are reasonable and the food tastes great .
Price (+)
Food (+)
the food was excellent and we highly
recommend the business .
Food (+)
General (+)
beer was all good and food generous and tasty .
Drink (+)
Food (+)
highly recommend this location for quality




Table 5.3: Example of segments and their corresponding labels obtained from the segmentation
and label assignment algorithms respectively across different aspects and sentiments. (+) and (-)
indicate positive and negative sentiments, respectively.
Aspect-specific Review Segments Label
steak sandwich was delicious and the caesar salad had an absolutely
delicious dressing with a perfect amount of dressing
and distributed perfectly across each leaf . we know we m going on about the salad .
Food (+)
today was my second visit to the place after having a good first experience
but we am so disappointed with the quality of the food
that we can say it has been my worst experience of food in months the sun
dried tomatoes very absolutely stale to an extent that they
tasted bitter the pizza base was so thick that
it was uncooked and soggy the four cheese blend tasted completely different
than the last time and so did the pesto sauce . no consistency with food quality .
Food (-)
the ambiance is nice too . it s a bit dark but they have this nice light display above on
the ceiling made with mason jars . there is a comfy seating area
in the bar area that s nice too .
Ambience (+)
however the one thing that surprised me was how dirty the restroom was in
this restaurant . the floor was really dirty and toilet papers were unwell kept .
the restaurant could at least have someone maintained the
restroom in good shape and clean because this
will reflect on how one maintains the cleanliness of the place .
Ambience (-)
the price is very reasonable for a family of four with plenty of leftovers to take home . Price (+)
my wife we had a groupon for this place and for the price it was very poor value quality . Price (-)
we had a nice glass of california cabernet . the wine list while not expansive was good .
the bartender we had seemed to have a nice knowledge
of what was going on with the wine that encompassed it .
Drink (+)
we ordered a glass of Merlot that was delivered to me in a dirty glass .
the waitress was very polite and went to
get me a new glass of wine but we was still unimpressed at that point .
Drink (-)
highly recommend for lunch . even during lunch rush it was not super packed .
this would be a good place for
a lunch meeting .
General (+)
we am not sure why anyone would like this place . the only thing it has going is
location and that is simply not
enough not for me .
General (-)
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With this definition in mind and given the output of the aspect encoder z, our generative model
learns to produce reviews based on information in z in addition to the information encoded in the
hidden states ht. For this purpose, the encoder output z initializes the first hidden states and in
order to reinforce its impact throughout the network, an attention layer is introduced to capture the
soft alignments between z and ht.
Each aspect-specific review sample is a row in the input review matrix R of shape n×T where
n is the number of samples in the training data and T is the number of time steps in the recurrent
neural network (also interpreted as the size of back propagation through time). Since the generator
aims to predict the next word at each time step, the output matrix (Y ) is just like the input matrix
but shifted by one word to the right defined as Y = R[1 :]. Without loss of generality, we now
describe the architecture of the review generator at time step t. It encompasses four main layers:
Embedding, stacked-GRUs, Attention, and Decoder.
The Embedding layer is a trainable matrix We that learns the low-dimensional representation
of the input tokens. The matrix shape is defined by vocabulary size V and embedding size. We
then employ a L-layer GRU recurrent network to capture the dependency among review words:









where hit is the hidden state calculated by i
th layer for word wt. It should be noted that hi0 are ini-
tialized with aspect encoder output (h10, . . . , h
L
0 = z). In addition, the attention layer incorporates
the aspect information into the hidden state calculated at the last layer for word wt. In particular,
given the hidden state hLt and aspect z vectors, we first apply a linear transformation to obtain a
score for each vector as st = (hLt ||z)×Ws, where Ws is a learnable parameter vector of shape 1×
hidden size and the concatenation of two vectors (hLt , z) gives a matrix of shape 2 × hidden size.
The st determines the score for each vector. Then the attentive weight is calculated with a softmax
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where v could be either a hidden state or aspect vector. avt is the weight indicating the relatedness
between aspect information around the next review word wt+1 to be predicted. Therefore, we







The updated hLt is fed into the Decoder layer. The Decoder layer is a linear transformation that
decodes the hidden state to predict the next word as ot = Wo.hLt + bo, where Wo and bo are the
weight matrix and the bias vector for the linear operation respectively and are learnable parameters.
The output vector ot is then activated by the softmax function to produce the probability distribution
over the words in the vocabulary ŷt = softmax(ot).
The output ŷt is then compared with the ground truth yt through cross-entropy loss as:






yt,j log ŷt,j (5.2)
Both y and ŷ are V-dimensional vectors, where V is the size of vocabulary and T denotes the length
of the sequence or number of the time steps in the RNN. The network parameters are then updated
over multiple iterations to minimize the loss value.
5.2.3 Diversity-enforcing Review Generator
Neural language models are often biased towards frequent patterns in training data while ig-
noring rare words. Specifically, the size of the vocabulary in the review domain is small and
the generator tends to generate repeated patterns. Therefore, we employ the diversity-enforcing
penalty function proposed in [118] as a regularizer to the loss function. In particular, it adds the












Table 5.4: Examples of generated reviews conditioned on input label.
Input Label Aspect-aware Generated Reviews
Food (+) The meat is amazing and the portions are perfectly balanced.
Food (-) The beef was dry and the chicken was tough.
General (+) The staff is impeccable and the food is exceptional and it’s not
a huge thing for the money
General (-) we would say they were extremely rude to us.
Amb (+) Great dining experience with a great vibe.
Amb (-) The room was nice, but the only thing we had was the lighting in the bathroom.
Price (+) The prices are reasonable and the service was very good.
Price (-) The price is a little expensive, but we would expect going for $ 20 for a steak.
Drink (+) That was a perfect drink spot to go with a pitcher of champagne on the menu.
Drink (-) They have a full bar with a decent selection of beers on tap, there were
no descriptions of the beers on tap, but we ’m sure that’s in a pint glass.
Intuitively, when training the model with cross-entropy loss, at time step t the embedding of
the corresponding word in the ground truth wt+1 is pushed to become close to the output vector ot
in order to get a larger likelihood, while the embeddings of the other words in the vocabulary are
pushed towards the negative direction of ot to receive a smaller likelihood. According to Zipf’s
law the word frequency in the training data is very low compared to the size of the corpus. For
a concrete example, in our dataset the frequency of the popular word “is" is only about 1.22%
while frequency of unpopular words drops drastically. Therefore, the embedding of the rare words
are pushed towards negative directions of most output vectors and they get low probability in the
final probability distribution ŷ. To encourage these rare words to become visible to the predictor,
we need a mechanism to push their embedding toward a positive direction correlated with output
vectors.
The idea of the regularization term is to increase the angle between words, i.e., minimizing the
cosine similarity between any pair of word embeddings, so they are not pushed in one direction.
We later in Section 5.3.2 show the effectiveness of the diversity-enforcing regularizer in producing
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diverse aspect-specific reviews.
Table 5.4 reports some samples of generated aspect-aware reviews across different aspects and
sentiments.
5.3 Experiments
We first describe the dataset. Then, we evaluate our proposed labeling methodology quali-
tatively and quantitatively. We also evaluate the quality of generated aspect-aware reviews from
different angles.
5.3.1 Data
Seed data. This dataset originally was introduced in the SemEval challenge [119] in 2016 for
Aspect Based Sentiment Analysis task. It contains 1,472 pairs of reviews and their labels after
removing duplicate samples. Moving forward, we use label to refer ro the aspect and sentiment
of the review. The dataset represents five different aspects as Food, Drink, Price, Ambience and
General coupled with the two sentiments as positive and negative (10 labels in total).
Yelp Dataset. This dataset was released as part of round 13 of the Yelp challenge in January 2019:
https://www.yelp.com/dataset/challenge. We use this dataset as the input to ADORE consisting
of segmentation and labeling methods and further it is used as the ground truth required by the
generative model. It has about 4M reviews for about 60k restaurants with 522M tokens. We
picked the top 51k most frequent words to build our vocabulary and keep only reviews with words
from the vocabulary, ending up with 2,791,379 (∼3M) reviews consisting of 258M tokens.
5.3.2 Experimental Design
Review pre-processing: The segmentation algorithm produces ∼7M segments out of the initial
∼3M reviews. However, not all of the segments are subjective. For example, the sentence “We
went there for lunch." does not express any opinion. To address this issue, we filter out subjective
segments using the TextBlob library https : //planspace.org/20150607− textblob_sentiment/
that calculates polarity of the text. It outputs about ∼3.5M reviews to feed to the weak labeler.
Hyperparameters. We are interested in a general model that performs robustly across different
97
labels, so we avoid setting up a highly tuned network and choose the hyper-parameters from sin-
gleton sets. We set the number of time steps in the recurrent model with respect to the maximum
review length, i.e., 70. We set input size, hidden size, learning rate, dropout rate, batch size, num-
ber of GRU layers, and optimizer to 100, 100, 0.001, 0.2, 20, 2, and Adam respectively. We then
adjust the learning rate decayed by 10 every 5 epochs. We only tune the number of epochs based
on the performance of the model on the validation dataset. We empirically find that the model
reaches a stable performance after about 10 epochs. We also split the review samples into training,
testing and validation sets with ratio of 90%, 5% and 5% respectively.
Review Generation. The model takes in the desired aspect and the starting word w0 which we
define by a special token as < sor > in training samples. At each time step t, it takes in the word
predicted at the previous time step (wt−1), the hidden state ht−1 and aspect vector to predict the
distribution for the next word wt and also updates the hidden state to ht. By feeding wt back to
the model, it produces another probability distribution to predict the next word. The generation
process continues until the model predicts the end of the review identified by a special token as
< eor >.
5.3.3 Experimental Results and Discussion
We evaluate the ADORE framework from two dimensions: the effectiveness of the weak label-
ing methodology and the performance of the generative model.
5.3.3.1 Evaluation of Labeling Methodology
We first determine the optimal threshold for segmentation. Then we compare our segmentation
algorithm with existing baselines. Finally, we conduct a user study to assess the quality of labels.
It should be noted that labeling evaluation is heavily based on a user study as the end goal is to
evaluate how the quality of segments and labels are perceived by end users.
Determining the distance threshold (τ ) for segmentation algorithm. We conduct a user study to
identify the optimal point for segmentation. This value determines whether to merge two sequential
sentences into one segment or split them into different segments. We empirically observe the
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distance between two sequential sentences varies from 1.00 to 1.35. Note that WMD is based
on Euclidean distance over normalized embedding vectors so the distance value varies from 0 –
two exact sentences – to the maximum value of 2. We pick 105 sample reviews and deploy the
segmentation algorithm on each review using different threshold values. We ask seven expert
labelers to identify the threshold that closely replicates the segmentation that would be done by
human segmenters. Table 5.5 shows the distribution of the thresholds determined by human judges
indicating value of 1.1 gives the more accurate segmentation results.
Comparison with Baselines. We study the performance of our proposed segmentation algorithm
with three baselines.
Sentence-level segmentation: This method breaks down a review into its sentences and takes each
sentence as one segment with the assumption that an aspect of the target is discussed in a single
sentence.
Review-level segmentation: Alternatively, we consider the whole review as a single segment with
this assumption that each individual review discusses only one aspect of the target.
Text segmentation based on semantic word embeddings [120]: This algorithm is based on word
embeddings for text segmentation and demonstrates state-of-the-art performance for an unsuper-
vised method and follows the similar scenario as our work. Briefly, it assumes the whole text to be
one segment and divides the text into multiple segments with sentence level granularity during a
recursive process. Intuitively, a segment is coherent if the similarity between its words wi and the
segment v as a whole is maximized.
However, this approach is designed to find the topic boundaries in long text such as scholarly
articles. In this study, we aim to show that our proposed unsupervised segmentation algorithm
outperforms the baselines when it comes to splitting a review (which is typically much shorter than
a scholarly article) into coherent aspect-specific pieces. Table 5.6 shows a motivating example of
different segmentation baselines.
There is a standard text segmentation evaluation metric known as Pk. It measures the error,
so lower scores indicate higher accuracy. However, it is based on a ground-truth of segments that
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Table 5.5: Human labelers identify 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 as optimal thresholds for review segmentation.
Threshold (τ ) 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35
number of votes 25 31 27 12 9 1
are not readily available in our scenario. For this purpose, we sample 100 reviews and manually
split them into their segments and aim to recognize the segmentation algorithm that produces
segments most closely to the segments obtained from expert evaluators. We refer to the segments
belonging to one review in the ground-truth as reference partition and segments obtained from the
segmentation algorithm as hypothesized partition.
Pk [121] is the probability of segmentation error. It takes a window of fixed size k, and moves it
across the review. At each step, it examines whether the hypothesized partition is correct based on
the separation of the two ends of the window. In particular, it counts the number of disagreements






[σhyp(i, i+ k) 6= σref (i, i+ k)]
Where σref (i, j) is a binary function whose value is one if the sentences we and j belong to
the same segment and zero otherwise according to ground-truth. Similarly, σhyp(i, j) is one if
sentences we and j exist in the same segment and zero otherwise according to the segmentation
algorithm. In the review domain due to short texts and sentence-level granularity for segmentation,
we set the window size (k) to 1. N refers to the number of sentences in the review.
We calculate the Pk for each review segmented automatically by the algorithm against the
ground-truth and take the average over all reviews. Table 5.7 shows the performance across dif-
ferent segmentation algorithms. ADORE produces Pk score with a lower value compared to its
alternatives indicating its effectiveness in finding the aspect boundary inside reviews.
How does automated labeling perform compared to manual labeling? Here, we are interested
in investigating if our weak labeler is comparable with manual labeling. For this purpose, we set up
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Table 5.6: An review sample is segmented at review-level and sentence-level and by state of the art
text segmentation algorithm, our proposed ADORE algorithm and human expert labelers. ADORE




dinner was fantastic . service was great we started with the corn soup
and the tuna tartare . we shared the filet
and scallops . both delicious entrees . we did not realize the steak came
with potatoes and ordered two
sides mac and cheese and shishito peppers .
we thought the peppers were really hot but we m a whimp we guess .
we will definitely come back .
Sentence-level
(seven segments)
dinner was fantastic .
service was great we started with the corn soup and the tuna tartare .
we shared the filet and scallops .
both delicious entrees .
we did not realize the steak came with potatoes and ordered two sides
mac and cheese and Shishito peppers .
we thought the peppers were really hot but we m a whimp we guess .
we will definitely come back .
Text Segmentation [120]
(six segments)
dinner was fantastic .
service was great we started with the corn soup and the tuna tartare .
we shared the filet and scallops . both delicious entrees .
we didn t realize the steak came with potatoes and ordered two sides
mac and cheese and shishito peppers .
we thought the peppers were really hot but we m a whimp we guess .
we will definitely come back .
ADORE
(Three segments)
dinner was fantastic . service was great we started with the corn soup
and the tuna tartare . we shared the filet
and scallops . both delicious entrees .
we did not realize the steak came with potatoes and ordered two sides
mac and cheese and shishito peppers .
we thought the peppers were really hot but we m a whimp we guess .
we will definitely come back .
Ground-truth
(Three segments)
dinner was fantastic . service was great we started with the corn soup
and the tuna tartare . we shared the filet
and scallops . both delicious entrees .
we did not realize the steak came with potatoes and ordered two sides
mac and cheese and shishito peppers .
we thought the peppers were really hot but we m a whimp we guess .
we will definitely come back .
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Table 5.7: ADORE outperforms the baselines by segmenting the reviews into their coherent topics
more accurately.
Sentence-level Review-level [120] ADORE
Pk 0.281 0.478 0.283 0.265
Table 5.8: Majority of the automated labels are recognized as accurate by human evaluators with
> 80% acc.
Label Accuracy Label Accuracy
Food (+) 94.33 Food (-) 85.66
General (+) 87.66 General (-) 81.00
Ambience (+) 81.33 Ambience (-) 77.66
Price (+) 86.00 Price (-) 68.00
Drink (+) 82.23 Drink (-) 57.66
a crowd-based user study to verify if the labels are assigned truthfully according to human readers.
We post 100 surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) each including a guideline and a set of
reviews for which we seek a label from Turkers. The guideline has two major points: (i) it shows
a sample of reviews along with their labels from the seed set to provide a context on how reviews
and labels are paired with each other, (ii) it asks Turkers to label the reviews through a series of
multi-choice questions. We design 100 surveys each with 10 reviews to cover all the labels. Each
unique survey is assigned to three workers, i.e., 3 HITs (Human Intelligence Task) per task, giving
us a total of 300 surveys and 3,000 questions.
To ensure the quality of responses, we insert a trivial question into each survey, which asks the
Turker to check if a mathematical equation is False or True. It helps to manage the risk of blindly
answered surveys. Furthermore, we only accept surveys from Turkers with approval rating of at
least 95% and those who dwell on the survey for at least 7 minutes. We also restrict our tasks to
workers located in the United States to guarantee English literacy.
Table 5.8 demonstrates the performance of the ADORE labeling process against human judg-
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ment across various labels. The key point is that the majority of the labels are found accurate by
human evaluators with at least 80% accuracy. However, the accuracy for labels Price/negative and
Drink/negative is relatively low and we can relate this to the fact that these labels do not have a
significant representation in the seed set (Table 5.1). We aim to release the annotated reviews to
contribute to the research community.
5.3.3.2 Evaluation of Generative Model
We evaluate the proposed joint generative model in generating aspect-aware reviews from three
dimensions. We first test how much labeled data is required to reach a stable performance. Second,
we evaluate how end users perceive the quality of aspect-aware reviews. Finally, we do an ablation
study on the impact of diversity-enforcing regularizer. Note that our aim complements efforts to
improve language models and we focus on automated labeling at the aspect-level and propose to
generate high-quality aspect-aware reviews as the downstream task for the labeled data.
How much labeled data is required to reach a stable performance? Although we propose
to build a ground truth by an automated approach, it is critical to understand how much data is
required to feed neural networks. In particular, when the target review domain for a specific label
is not sufficiently large we aim to discover how much labeled data would address the data scarcity
problem. For example, we observe that the distribution of the labels obtained from the weak
labeling process not only is not uniform but extremely biased towards popular aspects like food.
For instance,
we receive∼300k samples labeled as food/positive while only 412 samples are labeled as drink/negative.
For this purpose, we plot the validation loss during training epochs with various training size
in Figure 5.3a. We gradually increase the training size starting with 20k reviews. This shows that
approximately 60k samples are required to improve the performance at its finest. Figure 5.3b plots
testing loss versus the training size and echoes the same intuition.
How are aspect-aware generated reviews perceived by end users? Regardless of the model
performance with respect to labeling confidence and training size, the real test is to evaluate how
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(a) Validation loss in training (b) Testing loss w.r.t data size
Figure 5.3: Stable performance with at least 60k samples.
Table 5.9: Majority of the generated aspect-aware reviews are perceived as reliable by human
evaluators with 90% acc.
Label Accuracy Label Accuracy
Food (+) 93.07 Food (-) 97.69
General (+) 86.15 General (-) 85.38
Ambience (+) 97.69 Ambience (-) 90.76
Price (+) 90.00 Price (-) 83.07
Drink (+) 90.76 Drink (-) 33.84
reviews are perceived by human readers. Similar to label assessment, we launch a crowd-based
user study by posting surveys on AMT. We follow similar guidelines to those mentioned in the
previous section to ensure the quality of the answers.
We design 100 surveys each with 10 generated reviews at various aspects. We assign 3 HITs
per task, giving us a total of 300 surveys and 3,000 questions. We ask Turkers to label the model-
generated reviews through a multi-choice questions based on the aspect.
From Table 5.9, we observe that generated reviews stay with the desired aspect with higher than
90% accuracy for a majority of the labels. For example, 93% and 97% of reviews on Food (positive
and negative) are perceived equally by the model and the human evaluators while this number is
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X 996 1126 1122 1422 575 995 998 1600 888 1351
× 986 1096 1090 1289 601 1136 951 1431 983 1424
Unique
terms
X 186 174 162 306 45 168 162 244 149 249
× 165 162 130 247 51 164 139 202 175 253
TTR
X 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18
× 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17
MTLD
X 65 60 65 149 28 85 79 117 77 150
× 55 60 46 122 24 84 71 96 95 137
34% for drink/negative. We can relate this to the fact that the label Food has a better representation
in both seed set Table 5.1 and our expanded dataset as it is the main topic of discussion when
writing a review for a restaurant.
How does the regularized language model improve diversity? Here, we are interested to eval-
uate the impact of regularization on the quality of the generated reviews in terms of their diverse
vocabulary. To do this, we develop the model in the presence and the absence of the optimization
term described in 5.2.3. The testing loss is 2.80 and 2.93 respectively indicating that regularized
model adapt with significantly more diverse patterns. However, we take one step further and eval-
uate this feature qualitatively as well.
We pick a sample of 1k reviews generated by each of the models (2k in total) across various
labels. We then concatenate the samples in the same label category and report the number of words
w, the number of unique terms t, and the ratio of the tokens (TTR) calculated as t/w in Table 5.10.
The main intuition is that the more diverse reviews have a larger number of unique terms and
higher values for TTR. However, in the review domain, the number of unique words are limited
and TTR falls as we add more samples. Therefore, the MTLD (Textual Lexical Diversity) metric
is proposed [122] that counts the number of words before TTR falls below a given threshold. By
setting the threshold to 0.5, we see from Table 5.10 that MTLD for the regularized model is higher
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indicating they have more diverse vocabulary such that the more number of words are needed to
meet the TTR threshold. We also report the diversity metrics for aggregation of the reviews across
all the labels.
5.4 Conclusion
Investigating AI-based manipulation, we face a new challenge that motivates us to develop
new generative models in order to control the topic and sentiment of the generated reviews. Al-
though DIOR shows success in generating grammatically correct, meaningful and human-readable
reviews, it does not reflect topic and sentiment of the generated reviews. In this dissertation chap-
ter, we explored how to make use of weak labels in order to generate aspect-specific online reviews
when sufficient data required by neural networks are not available. The main intuition is to: (i)
build a ground truth of aspect-specific reviews automatically, (ii) propose a generative model that
produces reviews conditioned on input aspects; and (iii) evaluate the quality of the labels and
generated reviews.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This dissertation investigated manipulation powered by humans and AI in large-scale review
platforms and proposed several frameworks with inter-related techniques to combat them. In this
chapter, we first give a summary of our contributions and findings, and then provide multiple open
questions for future research.
6.1 Summary of Contributions and Findings
Crowd-based review manipulation. In Chapter 3, we described crowd-based manipulation
from sampling manipulation traces to characterizing and detecting manipulators and targets of
manipulation attacks. In particular, we developed a cross-domain data collection approach to ob-
tain samples of crowd manipulation given the previous efforts miss a ground truth for evaluation.
We proposed the TwoFace framework for detecting manipulators. The important findings are that
fraudulent users engage in a mix of legitimate and deceptive behaviors making this a challenge to
identify them through behavioral characteristics. Also, crowd campaigns do not form a dense block
over the co-review graph making this a challenge for dense-block detection algorithms. Therefore,
the proposed framework is built upon neighborhood-based characteristics. The important finding
is that although individual behaviors may be easy to mask, the collective campaign organization
can be uncovered by exploiting the network around reviewers and products. However, propagation
of suspiciousness misses fraudulent users that are distant in the suspiciousness graph. TwoFace
is enhanced by an embedding-based approach that maps users into a low-dimensional embedding
space and captures community structure of the graph. The main finding is that TwoFace uncov-
ers many manipulators even when the system is seeded with only a few fraudulent samples with
93% recall and 77% precision, outperforming a state-of-the-art baseline. Although crowd cam-
paigns do not show lockstep behavior that is the focus of dense-block detection algorithms, our
embedding-based TwoFace framework is able to detect them with high accuracy.
While fake review writers and fake reviews serve as a building block of an attack, the ultimate
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goal is often to manipulate a specific target. Knowing which products (or services,etc.) are targets
of an attack, we can defend the target from ongoing threats, develop more robust defensive counter-
measures for future threats and develop robust recommendation techniques to diminish the impact
of fake reviews on recommendation results. This dissertation built a ground truth of products that
have been targeted by crowd manipulation and it gave us this opportunity to study manipulation at
product level unlike previous works that focus on detection of either users or reviews. Therefore,
we proposed the TOmCAT framework for detecting targets of manipulation. It first identifies pat-
terns of crowd-based attacks as promotion, wherein a crowd seeks to manipulate the product rating
of a new product; and restoration, wherein a crowd seeks to counteract a low rating from a legiti-
mate reviewer. We found that the crowd campaigns are relatively small (soliciting between 5 to 10
reviews) that suggests they do not leave obvious patterns of synchronized behavior that could aid
in their detection. Another important observation is that crowd reviews demonstrate high-quality
content making existing methods that rely on signals of poor review quality to be ill-suited to
uncover them. Based on these observations and identified manipulation patterns, TOmCAT for-
mulated crowd attack foot-prints into a suite of features based only on timing and sequence of
product ratings and proposed a neural-based model to learn the review behavior at product level.
It outperformed several baselines and can be generalized over other review platforms. However,
the important finding is that although TOmCAT can uncover target products with high accuracy
by addressing existing attacks, strategic attackers can potentially create hard-to-detect behavioral
patterns by undermining timing-based footprints. we proposed TOmCATSeq to model review
behavior in an end-to-end way where it can restore the detection performance against strategic
attackers to some extent (Figure 3.18).
AI-based review manipulation. In Chapter 4, we described AI-based manipulation from dif-
ferent angles as generation, validation, and detection. In particular, we proposed a universal model
capable of generating synthetic reviews across different review domains such as Yelp, Amazon
and App store. The main finding is that the traditional linguistic-based spam detector may not
distinguish synthetic reviews from real reviews. This dissertation also found that the majority of
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synthetic reviews (80%) are recognized as real by humans indicating the power of the proposed
model in generating realistic reviews. The results of a user study show that human readers are
more sensitive to repetition errors than they are to small grammar mistakes. To validate the im-
portant question of whether neural language models are capable enough to take the place of crowd
campaigns, this dissertation launched a user study to evaluate how end users perceive the syn-
thetic reviews in comparison with fake reviews written by crowd workers and found that users find
reviews generated by the proposed DIOR as reliable as fake reviews written by manipulation cam-
paigns. The proposed DIOR beats the state-of-the-art model in generating effective reviews and its
unique feature is being domain independent and can target any arbitrary review domain even with
small available review samples. We found transfer learning not only facilitates the domain shift but
also improves the performance. In another examination, this dissertation showed that transferred
models need lower number of training samples compared to universal model to reach the stable
performance. Although model-generated reviews can pass the human and linguistic-based test,
they have different underlying distributions compared to human-written reviews, so they can be
detected with high accuracy based on their embedding representation.
Sophisticated AI-based manipulation. In Chapter 5, we described a new class of manipula-
tions that can control the topic and sentiment of the generated reviews. The main challenge is to
develop a dataset of reviews at topic and sentiment level. This dissertation developed a weak la-
beling methodology to build an aspect-aware review dataset and evaluated the effectiveness of the
labels using crowd-sourced annotation. It also showed that the proposed segmentation algorithm
to split a single review into its topically-coherent sub-reviews outperforms existing methods. As
part of the ADORE framework, we developed a joint generative model that generates aspect-aware
reviews. End users perceived aspect-aware generated reviews as realistic with 90% accuracy.
6.2 Future Work
Explainable review manipulation patterns. This dissertation proposed several frameworks
to detect online manipulations enabled by different actors from crowd to AI-based models. One
open question is given a deep learning model with a high detection rate of manipulation, how can
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we explain the output of the detection model? In other words, what are those patterns that guide
the model to distinguish between normal and anomalous behaviors? As a future direction, we can
explore the explainability aspects of these models. This helps us understand what features in the
data the neural model is learning and whether the resulting model is biased towards a particular
aspect of the data. Once we understand the relations between data and model, we can i) refine the
initial detection model for better performance; and ii) we can further improve the model to address
situations where attackers exploit the bias in the model to remain undetected.
Explainable review manipulation detection models. The explainability of end-to-end mod-
els for manipulation detection is under-studied for a couple of reasons. i) Due to the lack of
labeled data for manipulated contents, the detectors cannot benefit from supervised learning that
is the foundation of deep learning techniques for classification tasks. ii) The existing techniques
for explainable fake news detection cannot be directly applied to explain fake behaviors in general
since they come from different underlying data sources. News is fact-based and can be validated
in accordance with existing facts while user behaviors like promoting a hashtag through fake re-
tweet or promoting an item through fake reviews are subjective actions. Reviews are opinion-based
meaning different people may have completely different opinions towards the same target so as we
showed in this dissertation we need contextual information beyond review content to identify pat-
terns of manipulation. Since we curated a dataset of review manipulation wherein the existence of
fake reviews is evident, we are able to validate the proposed explainability techniques and expand
our experiments to alternative datasets with respect to generalization.
Extending the work on other review platforms beyond e-commerce systems. We have
performed the evaluation of the proposed frameworks over e-commerce review datasets through-
out this dissertation. Investigating manipulation on other platforms where enable users to leave
comments such as FCC can be considered as a future research direction given the intentions and
interactions are different from e-commerce platforms.
How to measure impact of fake reviews on consumers. Assuming the intention of the fake
reviews in a site like Amazon is to promote the items’ ratings in order to increase the revenue. An
110
open question is how we can measure the impact of fake reviews on revenue or to what degree
review manipulation is successful to reach this goal?
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